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I. Introduction
Imagine the following hypothetical. A divorcing couple is well into
litigation over the division of their marital property. Although they and their
attorneys have attempted settlement at various moments in the two-year
dispute, negotiations have failed to resolve their differences. They are about
to go to trial when a mutual friend suggests that they attempt mediation.
Both parties are skeptical about another attempt at settlement; each has heard
unfavorable things about mediation. But each would rather settle than
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litigate, if only to minimize their legal bills. As a result, they agree to meet
with a mediator.
Prior to their first mediation session, the parties speak with the mediator
on a conference call. The divorcing parties have agreed that they will try
mediation on the following terms: If the mediation fails to settle their dispute,
they will pay the mediator only her expenses for the day-not her daily fee.
But if the mediation successfully settles their litigation, they agree to pay the
mediator double her regular daily rate. "We want to settle, and we want you
to help us settle," they say. "If you are as good as people say, you'll be
willing to use this fee arrangement."
Assuming that the mediator is willing to take this offer,' should she be
permitted to do so? Most mediation ethics codes, court rules, and
commentators have categorically rejected such success fees as part of a
broader prohibition on all forms of contingent fee mediation (CFM). 2 CFM
includes any fee arrangement whereby a mediator's compensation depends
upon some characteristic of the mediated outcome, such as its amount, form,
or timing. For example, in addition to success fees, mediators are barred
from charging fees based on a percentage of the settlement amount or on a
percentage of the costs saved through avoiding litigation.
The logic of this prohibition on CFM is simple: mediators are only able
to assist parties if they remain neutral. Mediation ethics codes thus aim to
preserve neutrality by imposing strict and categorical requirements on
mediators. Such codes generally require that mediators remain both
impartial (unbiased as between the parties) and self-disinterested (devoid of
personal commitments, beliefs, or interests). CFM seems to conflict with
these requirements by biasing the mediator toward settlement or certain types
of outcomes. Mediation ethics codes have therefore banned CFM outright .
Under current mediation ethics codes, mediators and disputing parties
have little choice but to accept this vision of neutrality and the attendant
prohibition on CFM. This regulation raises a difficult question: how much
freedom should parties have in nontraditional dispute resolution processes to
structure the role of a third party such as a mediator? Self-determination has
long been regarded as a basic justification for and benefit of mediation.5 The
mediation process is designed to facilitate the parties' resolution of their dis-
pute on their own terms. But how far should self-determination go? Should
1. For a discussion of whether a mediator should want to use such a fee, see infra Part V.
2. See infra Part II.
3. See infra Part III.
4. See infra Part II.
5. In Standard I, the Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators begin by stating that "self-
determination is the fundamental principle of mediation." MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR
MEDIATORS § I (American Arbitration Ass'n, American Bar Ass'n & Soc'y of Prof'ls in Dispute
Resolution), at http://www.abanet.org/dispute/modelstandardardsofconduct.doc (last visited Sept.
19, 2003) [hereinafter MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS].
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parties be able to tailor a mediator's most basic obligations and functions to
suit their needs, or should certain aspects of a mediator's role, such as the
duty to remain neutral, be fixed ex ante by mediation ethics codes?
These questions are critical and timely ones for the field of mediation
ethics. The field faces a paralyzing dilemma as it attempts to emerge from
adolescence. On the one hand, mediation ethics is in shambles. The codes
that do exist consist of general and sometimes vague standards that are diffi-
cult to apply.6 A mediator is often subject to several different sets of ethical
guidelines, which frequently conflict and seldom offer much real guidance.
Enforcement is essentially nonexistent. All of this argues for unifying and
strengthening the approach of the mediation profession to ethics and self-
regulation.7 On the other hand, as mediation and other forms of alternative
dispute resolution have become more institutionalized over the last decade,
scholars and practitioners have increasingly asked whether standardized
mediation ethics rules have sacrificed the flexibility that has been the field's
hallmark and primary justification.8 This concern about flexibility argues
against more stringent ethics regulations. Strict rules-such as the
prohibition on CFM--can seem over-inclusive and unwise.
This Article argues for a new approach to mediation ethics that draws
from contractarian law and economics. This approach seeks to resolve the
dilemma between standardization and flexibility. In particular, it suggests
that rather than employ generalized but vague ethical standards-such as
those used currently in most mediation ethics codes-we would do better to
turn to rules that more clearly define mediators' obligations. In other words,
we should strengthen mediation ethics codes. At the same time, to preserve
flexibility, these rules should be both tailored by context and altered by party
consent. Unlike judges, mediators are creatures of contract. At least in pri-
6. See, e.g., FLORIDA RULES FOR CERTIFIED AND COURT-APPOINTED MEDIATORS R. 10.410
(Fla. Supreme Ct. 2000), at http://www.flcourts.org/osca/divisions/adr/Certrules.htm (last visited
Sept. 19, 2003) ("A mediator shall conduct mediation sessions in an even-handed, balanced
manner."); STANDARDS OF ETHICS AND PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY FOR CERTIFIED MEDIATORS § J
(Judicial Council of Va. 2002), at http://www.courts.state.va.us/soe/soe.htm (last visited Nov. 21,
2003) ("The mediator may suggest options for the parties to consider, only if the suggestions do not
affect the parties' self-determination or the mediator's impartiality.").
7. See, e.g., DWIGHT GOLANN, MEDIATING LEGAL DISPUTES 388-89 (1996) (discussing the
need for clear ethical standards in mediation); see id. at 428 ("[D]espite significant work on
standards, equally significant problems remain in meeting mediators' need for guidance.").
8. See, e.g., Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in Court-Connected
Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 1, 4 (2001)
("[T]he original vision of self-determination is giving way to a vision in which the disputing parties
play a less central role. The parties ... are cast in the role of consumers, largely limited to selecting
from among the settlement options developed by their attorneys."); Daniel P. Joyce, The Roles of
the Intervenor: A Client-Centered Approach, 12 MEDIATION Q. 301, 301 (1995) ("It is ironic that a
field that professes to value self-determination of parties and client-centered interventions is moving
toward standardization of practice.").
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vate mediations, the parties create the mediator's role by agreement. 9 Rather
than conceive of a mediator's duties as sacred and untouchable, I argue that
parties should be able to shape such duties to fit their particular dispute or
their goals for settlement. In other words, in some instances, we should
employ default-as opposed to immutable-ethics rules that parties and
mediators can change by contract. 10
This approach has its roots in contractarian law and economics, which
has had pervasive influence in such contexts as contract law,1' corporate
law,' 2 and securities regulation. 3 More recently, this literature has expanded
to consider how best to regulate legal ethics-whether and to what extent
lawyers and clients should be able to "opt in" to or "opt out" of professional
obligations.' 4 But, to date, the field of mediation ethics has not been subject
to this sort of scrutiny.
In this Article, I begin to develop a contractarian approach to mediation
ethics. To accomplish this goal, I focus on one example in depth: the debate
about customizing neutrality using contingent fee mediation. Although the
topic of CFM goes to the heart of our understanding of mediation ethics-
and will thus likely provoke controversy-authors have rarely discussed it in
the mediation literature.15  Contrary to conventional wisdom, I argue that
9. Here I refer to mediations in which two parties privately hire a third party to assist them, as
opposed to a court-connected mediation in which a judge might order parties to mediation or
appoint a third-party mediator or both.
10. Immutable rules are set ex ante and are not changeable by those affected by the rule.
Default rules are alterable by contract. See generally Ian Ayres & Robert H. Gertner, Filling Gaps
in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87 (1989); see
also infra Part II.
11. See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner, supra note 10.
12. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM.
L. REV. 1416 (1989).
13. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities
Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998).
14. See, e.g., Richard W. Painter, Rules Lawyers Play By, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 665, 728-31
(2001) [hereinafter Painter, Rules Lawyers Play By]; Richard W. Painter, Advance Waiver of
Conflicts, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHiCS 289, 326-29 (2000) [hereinafter Painter, Advance Waiver];
George M. Cohen, When Law and Economics Met Professional Responsibility, 67 FORDHAM L.
REV. 273, 286-90 (2000); see also Daniel R. Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1, 1-33 (1998); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, An Economic Analysis of Conflict of
Interest Regulation, 82 IOWA L. REV. 965, 972-79 (1997); Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Agency
Costs, andLaw Firm Structure, 84 VA. L. REV. 1707, 1752-59 (1998).
15. The only discussion of how fee structures impact mediation is a practitioner's note
comparing the agency costs created by hourly, contingent, and fixed flat fees. Andrew K. Niebler,
Getting the Most Out of Mediation: Toward a Theory of Optimal Compensation for Mediators, 4
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 167, 184 (1999) (concluding that "contingency fee arrangements should be
avoided in the mediation context"). The only other discussion of contingent fee mediation is a very
short comment by Professor Roger Fisher advocating the use of CFM to increase the supply of
mediators during the early market for mediation services. Roger Fisher, Why Not Contingent Fee
Mediation?, 2 NEGOT. J. 11, 12-13 (1986) (proposing an arrangement in which the mediator would
be paid only if a case settled, at which point the mediator's compensation would be determined
through negotiations between the parties and the mediator).
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CFM should sometimes not only be permitted, but encouraged. Although I
recognize that CFM can make a mediator self-interested vis-A-vis the out-
come of a mediation, this consequence should not, in my view, end our
analysis of its merits. Instead, a contractarian approach focuses on several
relevant questions. The first is whether an immutable rule like the ban on
CFM is needed to protect some social or economic interest. In this context,
if allowing parties to customize neutrality using CFM endangers some such
interest, then a categorical prohibition on CFM may be justified. If not-or
if, as I argue, CFM actually serves some social interest-then an immutable
prohibition may be unwise. The second question is whether we trust that
disputing parties will be able to contract effectively with mediators about
CFM or fear that mediators will be able to use CFM to abuse parties. If we
fear abuse, banning CFM may be necessary to protect parties. If we believe
instead that, in some contexts, parties will be able to bargain effectively with
mediators over fee structures, then allowing such contracts may be more
efficient.
1 6
I conclude that categorical, immutable rules prohibiting CFM are
misguided. Both mediators and parties would be better served by a tailored
default rule on CFM that takes into account the fact that mediations,
mediators, disputing parties, and dispute contexts vary tremendously. I
illustrate that, although a mediator must remain impartial as between the
parties to be effective, a mediator need not be completely disinterested vis-A-
vis the process or outcome of the mediation. Instead, in certain instances, it
may be rational for disputing parties to want a mediator with self-interests
that align with the parties' joint interests. If the divorcing spouses described
above greatly desire settlement, they may want to provide their mediator with
incentives to reach resolution. Contingent fee structures for mediator
compensation are one means to align the mediator's interests with the
parties' goals. In contexts in which sophisticated parties are likely to have
information about the nature of their underlying negotiation, there is little
reason to prevent CFM.
To develop these arguments, Part II first defines CFM and then analyzes
its treatment under current mediation regulations and ethics codes. Part III
presents the case against CFM. In particular, I explore the classical concep-
tion of mediator neutrality and demonstrate its influence. In Part IV, I argue
for CFM. I show that, in some cases, parties may want to customize
neutrality and offer a revised understanding of what neutrality they expect
from mediators. I argue that CFM does not necessarily undermine a
mediator's ability to serve parties and that it can serve party autonomy. Part
V then advocates for a context-specific, tailored approach to CFM that
16. See infra Part II.
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accounts for the diverse range of situations in which mediators become
involved in disputes. I argue for a new ethical rule for mediators that would
permit CFM in some circumstances, and I illustrate what sorts of mediations
would and would not be appropriate for CFM under such a rule. Finally, I
discuss the broader implications of contractarian law and economics for
mediation ethics, and I argue that a contractarian approach will best serve the
mediation community and disputing parties.
II. Existing Regulation of CFM
The contractarian law and economics literature has developed a rich
taxonomy to describe different types of rules. This Part briefly reviews the
contractarian approach to rule formation before exploring existing
regulations of CFM.
A. A Contractarian Taxonomy of Rule Types
1. An Introduction to Contractarian Economics.--Contractarian law
and economics categorizes duties along several dimensions.' 7 The first is
whether a given duty or obligation is immutable or default.' 8 Immutable
duties cannot be altered by contract; they are imposed upon parties regardless
of the parties' wishes. For example, the duty to bargain in good faith is an
immutable rule of contract law; parties may not contract out of it. 19
Similarly, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct forbid a lawyer from
commingling client funds with the lawyer's own, regardless of client
consent.2 °
In the mediation context, many ethics rules are immutable. Although
various ethics codes regulate the conduct of mediators, the Model Standards
of Conduct for Mediators ("Model Standards") 21 are the most prominent.
The Model Standards were promulgated by the American Arbitration
Association (AAA), the American Bar Association (ABA) Section of
Dispute Resolution, and the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution
(SPIDR).22 Drafted from 1992 through 1994, the Model Standards were then
17. For an excellent overview of this taxonomy, see Painter, Rules Lawyers Play By, supra note
14, at 674-92.
18. See generally Ayres & Gertner, supra note 10.
19. Id. at 87.
20. See Painter, Advance Waiver, supra note 14, at 290 (discussing this and other examples of
immutable legal ethics rules).
21. See MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS, supra note 5. The Model
Standards are also available in a symposium issue of the Journal of Dispute Resolution, 1995 J.
DIsP. RESOL. 122-28. They are also reprinted in SECTION OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, AMERICAN
BAR ASS'N, DISPUTE RESOLUTION ETHICS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE 257-62 (Phyllis Bernard &
Bryant Garth eds., 2002).
22. MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS, supra note 5.
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approved by the AAA, the Litigation Section and Dispute Resolution Section
of the ABA, and SPIDR.23
The Model Standards often impose immutable obligations on mediators
and parties. For example, the Model Standards state that "[i]f at any time the
mediator is unable to conduct the process in an impartial manner, the
mediator is obligated to withdraw. 24 Similarly, the Comments to the Model
Standards state that a mediator's purpose is to "facilitate the parties'
voluntary agreement" and that a mediator should "refrain from providing
professional advice. 25  This essentially requires a mediator to take a
"facilitative" as opposed to "evaluative" approach to mediation.26 Finally,
the Model Standards state that "[t]he parties decide when and under what
conditions they will reach an agreement or terminate a mediation., 27 This
rule is immutable. Even if the parties tried to vest control over when to ter-
minate the mediation in the mediator, the Model Standards suggest that a
mediator would be wrong to honor that attempt.28
By contrast to such immutable obligations, parties are free to contract
around default duties. Such rules set a baseline in reference to which parties
bargain. For example, in contract law, many of the provisions of the UCC
are default rules. They are binding "unless otherwise agreed., 29 Mediation
ethics rules are also sometimes default. For example, the Model Standards
provide that a mediator must avoid the appearance of a conflict of interest
both during and after a mediation and, thus, that "a mediator shall not subse-
quently establish a professional relationship with one of the parties in a
related matter, or in an unrelated matter under circumstances which would
raise legitimate questions about the integrity of the mediation process., 30 But
a mediator can circumvent these rules with party consent.31 Thus, so long as
the parties consent explicitly through contract, they can opt out of this default
obligation.
In addition to whether they are immutable or default, rules and
standards vary along a second dimension: the degree to which they are
23. Section of Dispute Resolution, American Bar Ass'n, ADR Policies, at http://www.abanet.
org/dispute/webpolicy.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2003).
24. MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS, supra note 5, § II.
25. Id. § VI cmt.
26. For a general discussion of the role of evaluation in mediation and of state standards on the
propriety of evaluation, see Murray S. Levin, The Propriety of Evaluative Mediation: Concerns
About the Nature and Quality of an Evaluative Opinion, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 267
(2001).
27. MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS, supra note 5, § VI.
28. See infra Part V for a discussion of whether this rule should be changed to a default rule.
29. See Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78
VA. L. REv. 821, 825 n.22 (1992) (giving this example and providing references to specific UCC
provisions).
30. MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS, supra note 5, § lII.
31. Id.
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tailored versus untailored.32 A tailored duty is designed for a specific context
or a specific set of contracting parties. For example, the Model Standards
have a few provisions that apply to court-connected, as opposed to private,
mediations.33 By contrast, an untailored duty applies to most actors in most
contexts. It is not designed for a subset; it is designed to apply to all parties
affected by the regulation in question. Most of the provisions in the Model
Standards are untailored in this way.
Third, a given duty may be either a clear statement; a rule; or a more
fuzzy statement, a standard.34 A rule defines acceptable and prohibited
conduct and sets clear requirements. For example, the Model Standards
provide that "[a]ny party may withdraw from mediation at any time. '35 This
rule is clear, setting out a well-defined guide for conduct. A standard, by
contrast, is more subjective. It relies on precedent or other factors to estab-
lish whether a violation has occurred. For example, the Model Standards
provide that a mediator shall decline to proceed with a mediation if a conflict
of interest "casts serious doubt on the integrity of the process," even if the
parties consent to the mediator's continued participation.36 This language
"casts doubt on the integrity of the process," leaving much room for
interpretation and argument. Although this is an immutable duty, it is a
standard rather than a rule.
In combination, these three dimensions give rise to eight permutations.
A given duty may be a tailored immutable rule, a tailored immutable
standard, a tailored default rule, a tailored default standard, an untailored
immutable rule, an untailored immutable standard, an untailored default rule,
or an untailored default standard.37 The question is which form of duty is
most appropriate in a given circumstance.
Immutable rules are appropriate in certain instances.38 First, immutable
rules are useful to protect important social interests. The following are
examples of immutable legal ethics rules: a lawyer may not suborn perjury,
misrepresent to a tribunal, or assert frivolous claims. 39 Society's interest in
32. See Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L.
REv. 608, 671-72 (1998) (summarizing the arguments for tailored versus untailored default terms).
33. MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS, supra note 5, § II cmt. (discussing
impartiality in court-appointed mediations and the supervising role of the court administration); see
also id. § III cmt. (discussing conflicts of interest that may be created by the appointing agency).
34. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Foreword: The Justices
of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REv. 22, 57-69 (1992).
35. MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS, supra note 5, § I.
36. Id. § Ill.
37. lan Ayres, Response to Painter, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 201, 205 n.20 (1996).
38. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 10, at 88 ("[l]mmutable rules are justifiable if society
wants to protect (1) parties within the contract, or (2) parties outside the contract.").
39. See Painter, Rules Lawyers Play By, supra note 14, at 730.
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suppressing perjury, misrepresentation, and frivolous litigation is sufficiently
important to justify immutable prohibitions on these behaviors.
Second, immutable rules make sense when one party has insufficient
information or bargaining power to contract effectively about a given issue.
Thus, we do not allow contracting with infants because of paternalistic
concern for their well-being. Similarly, as discussed above, we require
mediators to withdraw from a mediation if a "conflict of interest casts serious
doubt on the integrity of the process '4° in part because we question whether
disputing parties will have sufficient information about the mediation process
and a given mediator's reported conflict to make an adequate determination
on their own.
Default rules are appropriate for other reasons. In general, default rules
are likely to be more efficient than immutable rules.41 If parties can contract
around a default rule, they will do so to the extent that it creates benefits that
outweigh the transaction costs of the required bargaining. A default rule
permits parties to make this cost-benefit calculus for themselves. In the
absence of reasons to make a rule immutable, many commentators advocate
strongly for default rules.42
Some default rules are appropriate because most affected parties would
bargain for that rule and, therefore, establishing the rule saves transaction
costs by saving parties the expense of actually bargaining for the rule. Such
rules are called majoritarian default rules. 43  Other default rules-called
penalty defaults-are rules that most affected parties would not prefer.
44
Penalty defaults are useful because they force parties to bargain around the
default rule, thereby forcing parties to disclose information to each other that
might otherwise be kept private. For example, legal ethics rules barring con-
flicts of interest absent consent by both parties can be considered penalty
default rules. Although in practice most parties seem to grant such consent-
suggesting that a majoritarian default rule would permit such conflicts-
Model Rule 1.7 prohibits such representation without consent.45  The rule
forces lawyers to negotiate with their clients for consent.46 Penalty defaults
may be efficient because they encourage information sharing.
40. MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS, supra note 5, § III.
41. Anthony T. Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 351, 370 (1978).
42. See, e.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 48-51 (1993);
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE
LAW 2-3 (1991).
43. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults, 51 STAN. L. REV.
1591, 1591 (1999) (contrasting efficient majoritarian default rules with penalty default rules).
44. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 10, at 97. Ayres and Gertner discuss penalty default rules in
detail and provide examples. See id. at 96-101, 106-07.
45. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2002).
46. See Painter, Rules Lawyers Play By, supra note 14, at 686.
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Rules are generally preferable to standards when a rule making body is
clear about the rule's desirability and wishes to send a clear message.47
Standards may be preferable to rules in circumstances in which rulemakers
disagree about the relative merit of a given rule.48 A rulemaking body, for
example, might hesitate to impose a clear and immutable rule that parties
could neither contract around nor change through the common-law process
of interpretation. Instead, such a body would more likely adopt an
immutable standard.49
2. The Contractarian Challenge to Mediation Ethics.-Legal ethics
scholars have increasingly used the contractarian taxonomy of rule types to
analyze the professional obligations of lawyers. 50  For example, Richard
Painter has recently identified several trends in the evolution of legal ethics
rules. First, legal ethics rules have evolved from the broad standards of the
1908 Canons of Professional Ethics and the 1969 Model Code of
Professional Responsibility toward the more defined rules of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct. 5' In short, the regulation of legal ethics has
become more rule-bound. Second, those broad standards that remain are
typically found in controversial areas in which rulemakers are unlikely to
agree on a precise rule. 2  Third, legal ethics rules have slowly migrated
toward default as opposed to immutable rules.53 As Painter describes,
"[t]hese changes reflect a greater willingness to allow lawyers and clients to
define contractually their relationship, usually with the proviso that the con-
tract be in writing and that the lawyer consult with her client about the
consequence of contracting around the default rule., 54  Although this
migration has been somewhat limited, Painter argues that it should be
extended to various areas in which immutable rules remain.55
Should mediation ethics also evolve in the direction of default rules? I
believe that they should. The taxonomy of rule types illustrates the many
possibilities for regulating mediation ethics. As seen above, mediation ethics
47. See id. at 690-91 ("[D]efined rules often are used for less controversial subject matter,
particularly if enforcement is vigorous and penalties harsh, putting predictability at a premium.").
48. Id. at 690.
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., Painter, Rules Lawyers Play By, supra note 14, at 692-96; Painter, Advance
Waiver, supra note 14, at 326-29; Macey & Miller, supra note 14, at 972-79.
51. See Painter, Rules Lawyers Play By, supra note 14, at 668, 692-94.
52. Id. at 668-69.
53. See id. at 669, 694-96.
54. Id. at 695-96.
55. For example, Painter argues that Model Rule 1.13-dealing with a lawyer's obligations to
address a client's corporate fraud--could be amended to provide an opt-out default rule requiring a
lawyer to report fraud to a client's board of directors. Clients could opt out of this rule in their




codes contain a mix of rules and standards, some immutable and some
default. As a general proposition, however, these codes seem to lean towards
immutable untailored rules and standards. 6
Each instance of such an immutable rule raises questions. Is there some
important social interest the rule protects? Would a default rule be viable?
Are parties capable of contracting in this context? Could the rule be tailored
to better meet its purposes, whether cast as an immutable rule or a default
rule? Should it be a rule or a standard?
In many cases, the field of mediation ethics belies its youth by tending
towards untailored immutable rules and standards. The existing regulation of
CFM illustrates this tendency. The dominant approach has been to prohibit
CFM using an untailored immutable rule. 7 As we shall see, CFM presents
an interesting example of the need to rethink mediation ethics in light of the
contractarian taxonomy of rule types. The next subpart begins our
exploration of CFM by defining and giving examples of CFM.
B. What Is Contingent Fee Mediation?
Although rarely discussed, some mediators apparently do take
contingent fees. Kenneth Feinberg, the well-known mediator appointed to
administer the federal relief fund for victims of the September 11 th attacks,
58
is one example. In other mediations, Feinberg has reportedly taken contin-
gent fees, either as part of a fee agreement or as a bonus for successful
resolution of a dispute. 59 No empirical evidence exists, however, detailing
56. There are exceptions. For example, the Model Standards of Practice for Family and
Divorce Mediation is a set of standards specifically tailored to the family law context. MODEL
STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR FAMILY AND DIVORCE MEDIATION (The Symposium on Standards
of Practice 2000), http://www.afccnet.org/pdfs/modelstandards.pdf.
57. See, e.g., KIMBERLEE K. KOVACH, MEDIATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 279 (2d ed.
2000) [hereinafter KOVACH, MEDIATION] ("Prohibitions against contingency fees are... common.
This ban is based upon the premise that a mediator cannot have an interest in the outcome of the
case."); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution: New Issues, No Answers
from the Adversary Conception of Lawyers' Responsibilities, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 407, 446 (1997)
("[S]ome have suggested that contingent fees should be absolutely prohibited in ADR practice.");
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Professional Responsibility for Third-Party Neutrals, 116 ALTERNATIVES
TO HIGH COST LITIG. 129, 130 (1993) (labeling a prohibition on contingent fees a noncontroversial
proposition in the ADR field).
58. Diana B. Henriques & David Barstow, A Nation Challenged: The Special Master; Mediator
Named to Run Sept. 11 Fund, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2001, at B 1.
59. See Kenneth R. Feinberg, Billing Reform Initiatives, 59 ALB. L. REV. 963, 965 (1996)
(discussing the use of "mediation alternative billing arrangements such as a flat retainer and success
fee" and noting that such fees are "very controversial in some quarters"); see also KOVACH,
MEDIATION, supra note 57, at 279 ("[A] handful of practicing mediators bill on a contingency
basis."); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT FOR THE LAWYER AS THIRD PARTY NEUTRAL R.
4.5.5 cmt. 2 (CPR Inst. for Dispute Resolution, Draft 1999) ("It has become relatively common to
use contingent fee or bonus compensation schemes to provide an incentive to participate in ADR or
to reward the achievement of an effective settlement.").
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the sorts of contingent fee structures that mediators have used. Nor do
mediation texts describe such fee arrangements. To begin, therefore, we
must define what we mean by contingent fee mediation.
In the mediation context, I consider a contingent fee to be compensation
that depends in any way-such as amount, form, or timing-upon some
characteristic of the mediated outcome. This is a broad definition and one
that encompasses many different types of fee arrangement. Consider the
following hypothetical examples of mediation fees that are in some way con-
tingent on the mediated outcome. Although Part III will ultimately defend
only some of these CFM arrangements, each is, I think, an example of
contingent fee mediation defined most broadly.
1. Percentage-of-Settlement Fee.-A mediator intervenes in a personal
injury case between two strangers involved in a car accident. Plaintiff has
sued defendant for compensation for medical expenses, lost wages, and other
damages. Unable to agree on the proper valuation of the plaintiffs injuries,
the trial judge has ordered the parties into mediation. The mediator's fee
agreement bases her compensation on a percentage of the settlement
amount. 60 In other words, the greater the value of the final settlement, the
greater the mediator's fee. (Alternately, one can imagine this fee
arrangement in a private, as opposed to court-connected, mediation.)
2. Success Fee.-A corporation is involved in a dispute with one of its
managers. The manager's employment agreement contains a mandatory
mediation or arbitration clause. The employee is eager to resolve her
dispute; she is amenable to mediation. The corporation has retained a large
dispute resolution service provider to mediate such disputes. The
corporation's agreement with the mediation firm contains a fee clause that
conditions payment for any given mediation session on the successful settle-
ment of the mediated dispute. In other words, the dispute resolution firm
gets paid only for those cases that it settles successfully.61 (Alternately, one
can imagine this fee arrangement without the long-term contract with the
dispute resolution service provider and, instead, as simply part of an
individual mediator's fee agreement with the parties.)
60. Percentage-of-settlement fees may arise by association. For example, imagine that a
mediator settles a medical malpractice case. The plaintiff is represented by a law firm operating on
a contingency fee. The mediator's spouse is a partner in that law firm. Should that mediator be
allowed to mediate that case? See Diane K. Vescovo et al., Ethical Dilemmas in Mediation, 31 U.
MEM. L. REV. 59, 71 (2000) (arguing that, under Tennessee mediation regulations, the mediator
should withdraw "irrespective of the consent of the parties").
61. For an example of such a success fee, see Tom Reavely, Ethical Puzzler, at
http://texasadr.org/ethicalpuzzlers2.cfm (July 13, 1999) (concluding that a mediator should not
accept such a fee arrangement).
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3. Percentage-of-Cost-Savings Fee.-A mediator intervenes in a
complex class action lawsuit involving a defendant pharmaceutical company.
The plaintiff class, which is comprised of roughly 2,000 individual plaintiffs,
has sued the defendant for compensation arising out of allegedly harmful side
effects of the defendant's medication. Although none of the alleged injuries
are life-threatening, they vary tremendously. Drawing from prior experience
with mass tort and other class action litigation, the mediator is able to help
the parties create a compensation schedule that seems fair to both sides, as
well as to help them design a ten-year oversight body that will regulate the
compensation fund in the future.
The mediator had all parties read and sign a fee agreement prior to the
start of the mediation. That agreement set a daily rate for the mediator's
services but also indicated that the parties might be asked for a "voluntary
bonus or success fee" upon conclusion of the mediation. When the case is
settled, the mediator does in fact ask both sides for such a bonus, suggesting
that the mediator's assistance, ingenuity, and experience has easily saved
them at least $500,000 in attorneys' fees and other expenses.62 Defense and
class counsel agree to include a $250,000 bonus for the mediator within the
settlement agreement. (One can imagine this out of the class context or with
a completely voluntary bonus-a bonus not requested by the mediator. One
can also imagine this as a mandatory fee rather than as a voluntary bonus.)
4. Percentage-of-Value-Created Fee.-A mediator tries to settle a
commercial contract dispute between two companies, one in the Fortune 500.
The contract originally obligated Company A to supply parts and materials to
Company B. Although the two companies successfully did business together
under the contract for more than six years, two years ago B sued A for $30
million, alleging the materials A had been providing were substandard.
Relations have soured as a result of the lawsuit. Company B began
purchasing materials elsewhere, and neither company wants to continue to do
business with the other. They have retained a mediator to help them resolve
their monetary dispute, which is worth at least tens of millions if Company B
can prove that Company A is in breach. They assume the mediator will help
them end their relationship by determining whether, and how much,
compensation is justified.
But as the mediation progresses, the mediator broadens the scope of
their discussions, helping them separate their contract dispute from their
62. A percentage-of-cost-savings hypothetical was posed to a distinguished panel of mediation
experts by Professor Stephen Goldberg. Conference on Mediation, World Intellectual Prop. Org.,
Round Table: Ethical Obligations and Responsibilities of the Mediator and Mediator Immunity, at
http://www.arbiter.wipo.int/events/conferences/1996/discussion6.html (Mar. 29, 1996). Most on
the panel disagreed with such a fee, arguing that a mediator should be "completely neutral." Id.
(posting remarks by Willy Manfroy).
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broader business interests. She creates a working group of business people
from both corporations and facilitates their discussion of ways the two com-
panies could make money together (assuming they could get over their
contract dispute). After several months of work, the two corporations agree
to submit several remaining issues regarding their initial contract dispute to
binding arbitration. In addition, they announce a joint venture that takes
advantage of previously overlooked synergies between the two companies.
They estimate that the joint venture will generate roughly $500 million in
additional revenues for the two corporations over the next ten years. The
mediator's fee agreement entitles her to a small percentage (.001 percent) of
that new revenue as "unexpected value created as a result of the mediator's
efforts." This fee amounts to $500,000 and is significantly more than she
would earn on an hourly or daily basis. (One can instead imagine a voluntary
bonus based on value created.)
Each of these examples is a contingent fee according to my definition.
Whether based on the total dollar value of the settlement, the fact of
successful settlement, a percentage of cost savings, or a fraction of the value
created by the mediator, the mediator's fee in each example varies with the
mediated outcome. In Part III, I will argue that at least some of these fee
arrangements-particularly success fees, percentage-of-cost-savings fees,
and percentage-of-value-created fees-should be permitted in some
circumstances. Most current mediation regulations, however, prohibit each
of these types of CFM.
C. Existing Regulation of CFM
One need not look far to find evidence of the dominant approach to
CFM. This subpart reviews the patchwork of ethical guidelines, court rules,
state statutes, and other rules that deal with CFM, highlighting the general
tendency towards its prohibition.
One preliminary caveat is in order: this array of rules is sometimes
confusing. This confusion is not unique to the regulation of CFM; it reflects
a more general disorganization in the regulation of mediation. Each state
regulates mediation differently, often in decentralized and uncoordinated
ways. In a given state, the state's judiciary may or may not have adopted
rules to regulate court-connected mediation, and these rules may or may not
deal with CFM.63 (Similarly, the federal courts in that jurisdiction may or
63. Maryland, for instance, has adopted court rules governing mediation and has expressly
forbidden mediators from using contingent fee arrangements. See MARYLAND STANDARDS OF
CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS, ARBITRATORS AND OTHER PRACTITIONERS § VIII cmts. (Md.
Mediation and Conflict Resolution Office), at http://www.courts.state.md.us/macro/ruiles_
standards.html (last modified Jan. 15, 2003) (providing that a "neutral should not enter into a fee
arrangement which is contingent upon the result of the process or amount of the settlement"); see
also STANDARDS OF ETHICS AND PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY FOR CERTIFIED MEDIATORS § M(2)
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may not have local mediation rules.) 64  The state's private mediation
associations may also have ethical guidelines for private (not court-
connected) mediations, and those guidelines may or may not address CFM.
The local bar association may have guidelines that apply only to attorney-
mediators.
These different approaches to regulating mediation often make it
difficult to determine how comprehensively a state has dealt with a particular
mediation issue, such as CFM. For example, if all of these forms of regula-
tion exist in a given state and all bar CFM, CFM would be completely
prohibited in that state. But many states do not have such comprehensive
rules. Instead, a given state may have court rules but no ethical rules appli-
cable to private mediations. Although private mediators in such a state may
voluntarily follow the judiciary's rules even when not obligated to do so, the
potential exists for CFM in a private mediation in such a state. Similarly, a
state may have state court rules but no federal court rules, leaving CFM as an
option in the mediation of federal litigation but not state litigation.
Rather than obsess about this complexity, this Part simply shows the
general tendency to prohibit CFM. It begins by reviewing ethical guidelines
related to CFM. It then examines state and federal court rules, mediation
association rules, and bar association rules that address contingent fees in
mediation.
1. Ethical Guidelines Regarding CFM.
a. The Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators.-The Model
Standards discourage the use of contingent fees. Although the text of the
Model Standards does not mention contingent fees-requiring only that fees
be reasonable and that information about fees be provided at the outset of a
mediation 65-the Comments specifically state that "[a] mediator should not
(Judicial Council of Va. 2002), at http://www.courts.state.va.us/soe/soe.htm (June 2002) ("A
mediator shall not charge a contingent fee or fee based upon the outcome of the mediation.").
Conversely, Utah has adopted rules regarding mediation but does not speak to the use by mediators
of contingent fee arrangements. See UTAH RULES OF COURT-ANNEXED ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION R. 104, Canon I(1) (Utah Judicial Council 2002), at http://www.utcourts.gov/
resources/rules/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2003) (requiring merely that the parties include a description of
their fee arrangement in their written agreement to mediate).
64. For example, the District of Utah has adopted local mediation rules while the District of
Maryland has not. See Elizabeth Plapinger & Donna Stienstra, ADR AND SETLEMENT IN
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: A SOURCEBOOK FOR JUDGES AND LAWYERS 152-53, 279-84 (1996)
(detailing the alternative dispute resolution programs in each of the federal district courts).
65. MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS, supra note 5, § VII1.
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enter into a fees agreement which is contingent upon the result of the
mediation or amount of the settlement.,
66
As John Feerick, the chair of the committee that drafted the Model
Standards, has explained, the Comments "specifically discourage contingent
fee arrangements due to the potential for abuses that can diminish confidence
in the process." 67 The Model Standards forbid CFM to avoid "any incentive
for a mediator to coerce settlements. 68 In addition, Feerick argues that the
Model Standards should be understood to mean that "[m]ediators should not
directly or indirectly request, solicit or receive gifts or any other type of
compensation other than the agreed upon fee.",6 9  This understanding bars
voluntary bonus arrangements in addition to barring explicit contingent fee
agreements.
b. Local Mediation Association Ethics Standards.-Many local
mediation groups have issued ethical standards for mediators. Because these
ethics rules are not jurisdiction-driven, but instead bind all the members of an
association, they usually apply both to court-appointed mediations and to
private or voluntary mediations. They often ban CFM.7 °
66. Id. § VIII cmt. The Model Standards of Practice for Family and Divorce Mediation
similarly bar CFM. See MODEL STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR FAMILY AND DIVORCE MEDIATION
§ V(C) (The Symposium on Standards of Practice), at http://www.afccnet. org/ pdfs /model
standards.pdf (Aug. 2000) ("A mediator should not enter into a fee agreement which is contingent
upon the results of the mediation or the amount of the settlement."). Similarly, the Standards of
Practice for family mediators state that "[iut is inappropriate for a mediator to charge contingent fees
or to base fees on the outcome of mediation." STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR FAMILY AND
DIVORCE MEDIATION § V(C) (Acad. of Family Mediators), at http://www.mediationadr.net
/mediainformation/Medlnfo-Mediators/EthicsAFM.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2003). See also
STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR SOCIAL WORK MEDIATORS § 10 (The Nat'l Ass'n of Soc. Workers),
at http://uccr.net/2002 Symposiun/Keck-Standards of Practice for Social Work Mediators.htm (last
visited Oct. 8, 2003) ("Under no circumstances should the fee structure give the mediator a vested
interest in a particular outcome. Fees should therefore not be contingent on the nature of the
agreement or even on the achievement of an agreement.").
67. John D. Feerick, Toward Uniform Standards of Conduct for Mediators, 38 S. TEX. L. REV.
455,475 (1997).
68. Id. at 476.
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., STANDARDS OF PRACTICE § 3 (Cent. Tex. Chapter of the Ass'n of Attorney-
Mediators), at http://www.attomey-mediators-tx.org/ethical.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2003) (barring
CFM); ALABAMA CODE OF ETHICS FOR MEDIATORS § Il(8)(d) (Supreme Court of Ala.), at
http://www.alabamaadr.org/al-codeethics.html (June 1, 1997) (barring CFM); REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE CONDUCT OF MEDIATION AND MEDIATORS § II(8)(D) (Ark. Alternative Dispute
Resolution Comm'n), at http://courts.state.ar.us/pdf/0516 conduct.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2003)
(barring CFM); STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR CALIFORNIA MEDIATORS § 6 (Cal. Dispute
Resolution Ctr.), at http://www.mediate.com/articles/cdrcstds.cfm (Aug. 2000) (barring CFM);
REVISED CODE OF PROF'L CONDUCT § VIII cmts. (Colo. Council of Mediators), at http://www.
dola.state.co.us/SmartGrowth/ADRMediators/documents/mediatorscode.pdf (last visited Oct. 14,
2003) (barring CFM); STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR IDAHO MEDIATORS § 1(8) (Idaho Mediation
Ass'n), at http://www.idahomediation.org/stands of practice.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2003)
("Mediation is not based on contingency fees or percentages of the outcome of the settlement.");
STANDARDS OF PROF'L CONDUCT § VI (Me. Ass'n of Dispute Resolution Professionals), at
2003]
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These association standards vary little with regard to CFM. Often based
upon language taken from the comments of the Model Standards of Conduct
for Mediators, these association standards generally say something to the
effect that "[a] mediator shall not charge a contingency fee or base the fee in
any manner on the outcome of the mediation process.'
c. The Association of Attorney-Mediators Ethical Guidelines for
Mediators.-The Ethical Guidelines for Mediators promulgated by the
Association of Attorney-Mediators bar contingent fees even more explicitly
than do the Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators.72 The Guidelines
require that a mediator explain all fees prior to beginning the mediation and
state that "[a] mediator should not charge a contingent fee or a fee based
upon the outcome of the mediation., 73 These Guidelines are often incorpo-
rated as standards of practice by local chapters of the Association of
Attorney-Mediators. As such, they apply to both court-annexed and
voluntary mediations conducted by members of the Association.74
d Proposed and Existing Legal Ethics Rules and Opinions.-The
bar has traditionally failed to regulate the conduct of lawyers serving as
mediators. Neither the Model Code of Professional Responsibility nor the
http://www.madrp.org/ethics (last modified Apr. 4, 1999) ("A neutral shall not charge a contingent
fee or base a fee in any manner on the outcome of the process."); STANDARDS OF MEDIATION
PRACTICE § VII(B) (Or. Mediation Ass'n), at http://www.intemetmediator.com /pg 103 l.cfm (last
visited Oct. 14, 2003) (barring CFM); ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR MEDIATORS § 3 (State Bar of Tex.
Alternative Dispute Resolution Section), at http://www.texasadr.org/ ethicalguidelines.cfin (last
modified Dec. 26, 2001) (barring CFM); STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR MEDIATORS § VIII cmt.
(Wash. Mediation Ass'n), at http://www.washingtonmediation.org /ethics.html (last visited Oct. 14,
2003) (barring fees contingent "upon the result of the mediation or the amount of settlement");
ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR THE PRACTICE OF MEDIATION § 6.2 (Wis. Ass'n of Mediators), at
http://www.wamediators.org/pubs/ethicalguidelines.html (Apr. 4, 1997) (barring CFM).
71. See, e.g., STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR MEDIATORS § III(C)(1) (Mediation Council of
Ill.), at http://www.mediate.com/articles/illstds.cfm (Aug. 1999) ("A mediator shall not charge a
contingency fee or base the fee in any manner on the outcome of the mediation process."); ETHICS
AND STANDARDS OF CONDUCT § L (Pa. Council of Mediators), at http://www.pamediation.org/
ethics.html (Nov. 6, 1998) ("A mediator shall not charge a contingent fee or a fee based upon the
outcome of the mediation.").
72. ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR MEDIATORS § 3 (Ass'n of Attorney-Mediators), at http://www.
attorney-mediators.org/ethics.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2003) ("A mediator should not charge a
contingent fee or a fee based upon the outcome of the mediation.").
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., STANDARDS OF PRACTICE § 3 (Cent. Tex. Chapter of the Ass'n of Attorney-
Mediators), at http://www.attorney-mediators-tx.org/ethical.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2003) (barring
CFM).
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1983 version of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct mention lawyers
serving in this role.75
During the last decades, some state judiciaries and bar associations
moved more quickly than the national bar to regulate attorney-mediators.
For example, Virginia's Rules of Professional Conduct for attorneys include
Rule 2.10, which bars lawyers who are serving as third-party neutrals from
charging contingent fees.76 State bar associations have also issued ethics
opinions dealing with lawyers serving as mediators, and occasionally these
opinions address CFM. A Florida opinion, for example, permits lax'yers to
serve as divorce mediators so long as they follow certain precautions,
including not taking contingent fees.77
The newly enacted revisions to the Model Rules, approved by the ABA
in the summer of 2002, update the Rules in this area. The new Rule 2.4
addresses mediation, but in less detail than some of these state codes. Rule
2.4 requires that a lawyer-mediator inform unrepresented parties that the
lawyer does not represent them and explain the difference between the
lawyer's role as a mediator and a lawyer's role as a partisan advocate.7 ' Rule
2.4 does not, however, address CFM or a mediator's fees. Instead, the Rule
focuses simply on educating parties about the lawyer's role as a third party.
Even with widespread adoption, therefore, the new Rule 2.4 will not directly
impact the ability of lawyer-mediators to work on a contingent fee basis.
Rule 2.4 may have, however, an indirect impact on CFM in two ways.
First, Rule 2.4 suggests that a lawyer-mediator's conduct may be subject to
the strictures of the remaining Model Rules.79 Thus, Rule 1.5, on fees, may
apply to CFM in mediations conducted by an attorney. Rule 1.5 requires that
any contingent fee agreement involving a lawyer "shall be in a writing signed
by the client and shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined,
including the percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the
event of settlement, trial or appeal. 80  In addition, Rule 1.5 requires that
"[u]pon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the
client with a written statement stating the outcome of the matter and, if there
is a recovery, showing the remittance to the client and the method of its
determination." 81 Lawyers are barred from accepting contingent fees in any
75. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY (1980); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
(1983) (both failing to mention lawyers serving as mediators).
76. VA. SUP. CT. R. 2.10(g).
77. Fla. State Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. 86-8 (1986) ("It is inappropriate for a mediator to charge a
contingency fee or to base the fee on the outcome of the mediation process.").
78. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.4(b) (2002).
79. Id. R. 2.4 cmt. 5 ("Lawyers who represent clients in alternative dispute-resolution processes
are governed by the Rules of Professional Conduct.").




,82 8"domestic relations matter" or in representing a criminal defendant.83
Although these rules were not drafted to govern lawyer-mediators and Rule
1.5 does not bar CFM, it could be construed to apply to and constrain
contingent fee mediation.
Second, although the new Model Rule 2.4, as adopted by the ABA, does
not address CFM, the national bar certainly considered reform proposals that
did touch upon this issue. In the process of drafting the recent revision to the
Model Rules, various mediation-related organizations put forth proposals for
regulating mediators. The most prominent example was drafted by the
Commission on Ethics and Standards in ADR (sponsored by Georgetown
University and the CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution-a nonprofit
initiative of more than 500 general counsels of major corporations, members
of leading law firms, and legal academics interested in alternative dispute
resolution).84 The Commission submitted a Proposed Model Rule of
Professional Conduct for The Neutral Lawyer. This proposed Rule 4.5.5,
although not adopted, stated in part that:
A third party neutral who charges a fee contingent on the settlement or
other specific resolution of the matter should explain to the parties that
such an arrangement gives the third party neutral a direct financial
interest in settlement that may conflict with the parties' possible
interest in terminating the proceedings without reaching settlement.
The third party neutral should consider whether such a fee
arrangement creates an appearance or actuality of partiality,
inconsistent with the requirements of Rule 4.5.3 [on impartiality].
85
Although it was not incorporated into the final Model Rule 2.4, such
proposals may have an impact on state judiciaries and bar associations as
they consider revising or expanding the new Model Rules for local adoption.
The proposal contemplates CFM and permits it so long as the mediator
discusses the contingent fee and its consequences with the parties.
This proposed rule could have been a step in the right direction.
Unfortunately, the proposed rule is both general and somewhat vague. It
fails to set out clear guidelines for mediators or parties considering CFM.
For example, the proposed rule does not require party consent to a contingent
fee arrangement nor does it require other safeguards on mediator abuse of
CFM. Moreover, the requirement that a "third party neutral should consider
82. Id. R. 1.5(d)(1).
83. Id. R. 1.5(d)(2).
84. PROPOSED MODEL RULE OF PROF'L CONDUCT FOR THE NEUTRAL LAWYER (CPR-
Georgetown Comm'n on Ethics and Standards in ADR), at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k/
meadow.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2003).
85. Id. R. 4.5.5(3).
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whether such a fee arrangement creates an appearance or actuality of
partiality" 86 is vague. Does this mean that a contingent fee is forbidden if it
does create such partiality? Or is some partiality acceptable? How is a
mediator to distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable CFM?
D. Court Rules Regarding CFM
Many state and federal courts87 have issued court rules to regulate
mediation. These rules generally apply to the mediation of disputes within
the court system-court-appointed or court-connected mediation.
88
Sometimes these regulations are extensive, and, in other cases, they are quite
sparse. Many of them touch on-and prohibit-CFM, but the fact remains
that many do not leave open the possibility of unregulated contingent fee
mediation. 89 This subpart reviews these various rules.
1. The Categorical Approach: Banning or Ignoring CFM.-Of those
states that have addressed CFM by court rule, Florida provides a typical
example. The Florida Rules for Certified and Court-Appointed Mediators
provide that "[a] mediator shall not charge a contingent fee or base a fee on
the outcome of the process."90  Various other states have taken a similar
approach, clearly prohibiting CFM in court-connected mediations. 9' Some
86. Id.
87. Some federal courts have issued local mediation rules without addressing contingent fees.
See, e.g., MEDIATION PROGRAM PROCEDURES R. (i) (U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Idaho), at
http://www.id.uscourts.gov/docs/GENORl30.pdf (Nov. 13, 1996) (stating that "[m]ediators shall be
compensated at their regular fees and expenses," but not discussing CFM). Others have prohibited
CFM. For example, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana has issued Local
Rules on Alternative Dispute Resolution. They state that "[a] Mediator may not give or receive any
commission, rebate, contingent fee, or similar remuneration for referring any person to mediation or
for serving as a Mediator." LOCAL RULES OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION R. 2.5(b) (U.S.
Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Ind.), at http://www.insd.uscourts.gov/rules/ADRRules2003.pdf (Apr.
16, 2003). Although a comprehensive survey of the various federal rules is beyond the scope of this
Article, these examples illustrate the variation that is almost certainly present across the federal
circuits.
88. Some state court rules bar CFM in both court-connected and private mediation. See, e.g.,
ALABAMA CODE OF ETHICS FOR MEDIATORS § 11(a) (Supreme Court of Ala.), at http://www.
alabamaadr.org/al_code_ethics.html (June 1, 1997) (extending the Code to the mediation of cases
pending in the state courts and to private mediation by mediators listed on the roster of the Alabama
Center for Dispute Resolution); THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE CONDUCT OF MEDIATION AND
MEDIATORS § III(8)(d) (Ark. Alternative Dispute Resolution Comm'n), at
http://courts.state.ar.us/pdf/0516 conduct.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2003) (banning contingent fees
and urging application to both contexts).
89. See, e.g., MEDIATION PROGRAM PROCEDURES R. (i) (U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of
Idaho), at http://www.id.uscourts.gov/docs/GENOR I30.pdf (Nov. 13, 1996).
90. FLORIDA RULES FOR CERTIFIED AND COURT-APPOINTED MEDIATORS R. 10.380(0
(Supreme Court of Fla.), at http://www.flcourts.org/osca/divisions/adr/Certrules.htm (last visited
Oct. 14, 2003).
91. See CAL. CT. R. 1620.9(c) ("The amount or nature of a mediator's fees must not be made
contingent upon the outcome of the mediation."); ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION RULES App.
C, Ch. 1, § A(V) (Ga. Comm'n on Dispute Resolution), at http://www.state.ga.us/gadr/
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states and federal district courts have also barred contingent fees in specific
mediation contexts-such as divorce mediation-or have barred giving a
mediator a gift, even if they do not otherwise explicitly address the question
of contingent fee mediation.92
It is important to note, however, that at least half of the state judiciaries
seem not to have regulated CFM (or, in some cases, to have regulated
mediation at all). The lack of regulation leaves open the possibility that a
mediator who belonged to no association with ethics rules barring CFM
could use a contingent fee in a court-connected mediation. 93  Sometimes
appendxc.html (Sept. 20, 2000) ("Fees may never be contingent upon a specific result. It is
imperative that the mediator have no 'stake' in the outcome."); INDIANA ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION RULES R. 2.6 (Ind. Supreme Court 2003), at http://www.in.gov/judiciary/rules/
adr/index.html (Aug. 1, 2003) (setting hourly fees in mediation); id. R. 7.7(A) (barring contingency
fees in all court-connected ADR processes); KAN. SUP. CT. R. 903(h) cmt., at http://www.kscourts
.org/ctruls/adrruls.htm (last modified May 2002) (barring contingency fees); STANDARDS OF
ETHICS AND PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY FOR CERTIFIED MEDIATORS § M(3) (Judicial Council of Va.
2002), at http://www.courts.state.va.us/soe/soe.htm (June 2002) ("A mediator shall not give or
receive any commission or other monetary or non-monetary form of consideration in return for
referral of clients for mediation services."); id. § M(2) ("A mediator shall not charge a contingent
fee or a fee based upon the outcome of the mediation."); MARYLAND STANDARDS OF CONDUCT
FOR MEDIATORS, ARBITRATORS AND OTHER ADR PRACTITIONERS § VIII cmt. (Md. Mediation
and Conflict Resolution Office), at http://www.courts.state.md.us/macro/standardsfinal.pdf (last
modified Sept. 9, 2003) ("A neutral should not enter into a fee agreement which is contingent upon
the result of the process or amount of the settlement."); MASS. SUP. JUD. CT. R. 1:18 ("Fee
agreements may not be contingent upon the result of the dispute resolution process or amount of the
settlement."); MINN. GEN. DIST. CT. PRACTICE R. 114 (barring CFM); COURT ANNEXED
MEDIATION RULES FOR CIVIL LITIGATION § XV(H) cmt. (Miss. Supreme Court), at http://www.
mssc.state.ms.us/rules/AllRulesText.asp?IDNum=37 (June 27, 2002) (barring CFM); STANDARDS
OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS IN COURT-CONNECTED PROGRAMS § VII(C) (Supreme Court of
N.J.), at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/notices/n000216a.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2003) ("A
mediator shall not enter into a fee agreement in which the amount of the fee is contingent upon the
result of the mediation or the financial amount of the settlement."); NORTH CAROLINA STANDARDS
OF PROF'L CONDUCT FOR SUPERIOR COURT MEDIATORS § VII(D) (N.C. Dispute Resolution
Comm.), at http://www.nccourts.org/Courts/CRS/councils/DRC/Standards/Conduct.asp (last
modified Oct. 22, 2002) ("A mediator shall not charge a contingent fee or a fee based on the
outcome of the litigation."); STANDARDS OF PROF'L CONDUCT FOR RULE 31 NEUTRALS R. 25,
App. A, § 9(d) (Tenn. Supreme Court), at http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/opinions/tsc/rules/TNrules
ofcourt/06supct25 _end.htm (Jan. 28, 1981) ("A mediator shall not charge a contingent fee or base a
fee in any manner on the outcome of the process.").
92. See, e.g., LOCAL RULES FOR ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION R. 6-3(b) (U.S. Dist. Ct.
for the N. Dist. of Cal. 2000), at http://www.adr.cand.uscourts.gov/adr/adrdocs.nsf/156691 e 4d829
edc3882564e900738ec7/$FILE/Adr300.pdf ("No party may offer or give the mediator any gift.").
This is also true of local ethics standards promulgated by mediation associations. See, e.g.,
STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR CALIFORNIA MEDIATORS § 6 (Cal. Dispute Resolution Council
2000), at http://www.mediate.com/articles/cdrcstds.cfin ("[A] Mediator must not solicit, accept, or
exchange any fee, gift, or favor of significant value with any participant.., in any pending,
scheduled or concluded mediation for a reasonable time.").
93. Because of the many ways in which states and local groups regulate mediation-through
statutes, court rules, ethics rules, etc.-it is difficult to prove for certain that a given state has not
barred CFM. Nevertheless, my research into the various approaches to CFM suggests that the
following state judiciaries do not currently prohibit contingent fees in mediation: Alaska, see
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variation exists even within a state judiciary. Illinois, for example,
authorizes its judicial circuits to undertake mediation programs and establish
rules of conduct for those programs.94 Although some such circuits have
prohibited CFM, others have not.
95
2. A Minority Approach: Tailored CFM Standards in the State of
Hawaii.--Only one state judiciary seems to have reconsidered the wisdom of
the majority approach. On July 11, 2002, the Hawaii State Judiciary adopted
new Guidelines for Hawaii Mediators (the "Hawaii Guidelines").96 The
Hawaii Guidelines explicitly address the question of contingent fees but take
a more nuanced approach than other states. The Hawaii Guidelines require
that mediators explain their fees to the parties and create a written fee agree-
ment before commencing mediation.97 In addition, the Hawaii Guidelines
list three "possibilities" regarding fee structures.
The first possibility is the standard ban on contingent fees: "Neither
mediators nor their agencies should charge contingent fees or base fees on
ALASKA CT. Civ. R. 100 (permitting mediation, but not mentioning fees); Arizona, see ARIZ.
STANDARDS & GUIDELINES FOR COURT-CONNECTED MEDIATION PROGRAMS (Ariz. Supreme
Court), at http://www.supreme.state.az.us/orders/admorder/orders99/pdf96/9636.pdf (July 31, 1996)
(establishing mediation, but not mentioning contingent fees); Connecticut, see CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 13-91 (West 1991 & Supp. 2003) (permitting mediation, but not mentioning fees);
Delaware, see DEL. SUPER. CT. R. CIv. P. 16.1(i) (allowing mediator and parties to set fee
structure); Idaho, see IDAHO R. CIv. P. 16(k)(8) (allowing mediators to charge their regular fees);
Kentucky, see KY. SUP. CT. R. 3.815 (permitting mediation but not establishing fee structure);
Louisiana, see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4201 (West 1997 & Supp. 2003) (allowing mediators and
parties to set fee structure); Montana, see MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-21 R. 54 (allowing mediation but
not addressing fee structure); Nebraska, see NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2913 (allowing mediation but
not addressing fee structure); New Hampshire, see N.H. SUPER. CT. R. 170(G)(1)(g) (allowing
mediation but not addressing fee structure); North Dakota, see N.D. CT. R. 8.8 (allowing mediation
but not setting fee structure for non-domestic civil disputes); Ohio, see OHIO SUP. CT. R. XIV § 6
(establishing court-ordered settlement conferences but failing to provide the structure of the
mediator's fees); South Carolina, see S.C. CIR. CT. ADR R. 10(a) (allowing parties who choose a
mediator to set fee structure); Utah, see UTAH JUD. ADMIN. R. 4-510 (establishing court-annexed
mediation but not addressing fee structure); Vermont, see VT. R. Civ. P. 16.3(e)(1)(A) (allowing
mediator and parties to set fee structure); West Virginia, see W. VA. TRIAL CT. R. 25.06 (allowing
mediator and parties to determine compensation); Wyoming, see WYo. R. CIv. P. 40(d) (allowing
mediator and parties to determine compensation).
94. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 99.
95. Compare ILL. 18TH CIR. CT. R. 14.17, at http://www.dupageco.org/circuitcourt/generic.
cfm?doc id=592 (last visited Oct. 19, 2003) (allowing the parties and the mediator to set the
mediator's compensation when the parties chose the mediator but setting an hourly rate for
mediators chosen by the court), with ILL. 19TH CIR. CT. R. 20.03(b), at
http://l9thcircuitcourt.state.il.us/rules/rules20.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2003) (allowing the parties
and the mediator to set the mediator's compensation for any court-annexed mediation).
96. GUIDELINES FOR HAWAII MEDIATORS (Haw. Supreme Court), at http://www.courts.state.
hi.us/attachment/3D52C4AB783B29B7EC64289CC8/guidelines.pdf (July 11, 2002) [hereinafter
GUIDELINES FOR HAWAII MEDIATORS].
97. Id. § IV(I).
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the outcome of mediation." 98 The second possibility is a modified ban on
CFM: "Neither mediators nor their agencies should charge contingent fees or
base fees on the outcome of mediation unless special precautions are taken
to minimize potential conflicts associated with the fee arrangement."99
Finally, the Hawaii Guidelines list a third possibility: "Charging contingent
fees or fees based on the outcome is normally discouraged, although in
special situations with competent advice, both participants may agree to such
arrangements."'00
The Reporter's Notes to the Hawaii Guidelines state that although
"[v]irtually all standards which have considered this issue have categorically
disallowed such fees," the Hawaii Guidelines revision project experienced
"unresolved discussions about whether contingency fees should be
allowed."''1  Apparently the Supreme Court of Hawaii determined that
leaving mediators and parties a choice fit most comfortably with the media-
tion community in their state. Rather than choose between these three
mutually exclusive "possibilities," it left each intact when adopting the
Guidelines.
The Reporter's Notes indicate hesitation to ban CFM because
"sophisticated participants who desire and use this type of fee arrangement
would be prevented from using it.' 0 2 In addition, the Hawaii Guidelines are
designed as voluntary guides to behavior, not mandatory standards. As the
Supreme Court of Hawaii stated in promulgating the Guidelines, "this
court.. .encourages all mediators to make thoughtful use of the
Guidelines.... The Guidelines are not promulgated as binding rules, and
they are not intended to regulate the work of mediators."'
0 3
Like the proposed Rule 4.5.5 submitted to the ABA by the Commission
on Ethics and Standards in ADR,10 4 the approach taken in Hawaii, although
somewhat confusing, is promising in several ways. First, it shows that some
mediators are beginning to reconsider the accepted understanding that CFM
is per se problematic. The Hawaii Guidelines were developed by the state's
judiciary in conjunction with the local chapter of the Association of Conflict
Resolution (ACR), a leading national association of mediators.10 5  This
collaboration suggests that at least part of the mediation community is open
to the possibility of CFM. Second, the Hawaii approach suggests a direction
98. Id. § IV(2)(1).
99. Id. § IV(2)(2) (emphasis added).
100. Id. § IV(2)(3) (emphasis added).
101. Id. § IV(2) cmt.
102. Id.
103. In re Guidelines for Haw. Mediators (Haw. July 11, 2002), at http://www.courts.state.hi.us
/attachment/3D52C4AB783B29B7EC64289CC8/guidelines.pdf.
104. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
105. GUIDELINES FOR HAWAII MEDIATORS, supra note 96.
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for exploration-a tailored, as opposed to categorical, rule that allows parties
to contract for CFM. By requiring "competent advice," for example, the
Guidelines attempt to tailor the third possibility to sophisticated parties with
counsel. 10 6 As I argue in Part IV, such a tailored approach is more promising
than current prohibitions on CFM. Although the Hawaii Guidelines offer
insufficient guidance to mediators and parties considering CFM, the
Guidelines are, in my opinion, a promising beginning.
E. Institutional Rules Regarding CFM
Various mediation and dispute resolution organizations regulate the
conduct of mediators working under their auspices. 0 7 Unlike the ethics stan-
dards promulgated by mediation associations, these institutional rules apply
not to any particular group of mediators, but rather to mediations in
general. 0 8 If a contractual dispute resolution clause indicates that disputes
regarding the contract will be mediated in accordance with the procedures
and rules of a given mediation organization, then that organization's rules
apply regardless of the mediator used.
A few mediation and dispute resolution associations ban CFM.'0 9 The
Mediation Rules and Procedures of the United States Arbitration and
Mediation office, for example, state that "[m]ediation services are not
provided on a contingent fee basis."' 10 Many other organizations have not
dealt with the CFM issue explicitly."' For example, the Mediation
Procedures of the CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution in New York--one of
the most prominent mediation organizations in the United States--do not
address contingent fees. The Procedures require that a mediator's compen-
sation be determined before the mediation begins and state that the
mediator's compensation will be borne equally by the parties, unless they
agree otherwise. 1 2  Similarly, the American Arbitration Association's
Commercial Dispute Resolution Procedures, as amended on July 1, 2003,
provide that all expenses of the mediation shall be borne equally by the
106. Id. § IV(2)(3).
107. See, e.g., COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES (American
Arbitration Ass'n), at http://www.adr.org/index2.1 .jsp?JSPssid= 15747&JSPsrc=upload\ LIVESITE\
RulesProcedures\NationalInternational\..\..\focusArea\commercial \AAA235current.htm (July 1,
2003) [hereinafter COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES].
108. See id. INTRODUCTION ("Mediation is administered by the AAA in accordance with its
Commercial Mediation Procedures.").
109. E.g., WAMS MEDIATION RULES AND PROCEDURES § It (Wash. Arbitration and
Mediation Serv.), at http://www.usamwa.com/med_procedures.html (last modified Feb. 18, 2003).
110. USA&M MEDIATION RULES AND PROCEDURES R. 11 (U.S. Arbitration and Mediation), at
http://www.usam.com/services/medjprocedures.shtml (last visited Sept. 19, 2003).
111. See, e.g., JAMS ETHICS GUIDELINES FOR MEDIATORS (JAMS), at http://www.jamsadr.
corn/ETHICS for mediators.asp (last visited Oct. 19, 2003) (failing to mention requirements for
compensation).
112. THE CPR MEDIATION PROCEDURE § 2 (CPR Inst. for Dispute Resolution), at http://www.
cpradr.org/m_proced.htm#selecting (Apr. 1, 1998).
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parties, unless they agree otherwise. 1 3 Whereas previous versions of the
Commercial Mediation Rules (now incorporated in the Commercial Dispute
Resolution Procedures) stated that a mediator shall be paid "based on the
number of hours of mediator time," ' 14 the current rules state that "the parties
are responsible for compensating the mediator at his or her published rate...
(hourly or per diem)." ' 15 Although the current rules suggest that only hourly
or per diem fees are permitted, they leave the status of CFM somewhat
unclear. The Mediation and Arbitration Rules of the Commercial Arbitration
and Mediation Center for the Americas likewise state simply that all
expenses of the mediator shall be borne equally by the parties, unless they
agree otherwise. 116 This language leaves open the possibility of contingent
fees.
F. Summary
In summary, this Part demonstrates three things that are troubling in
combination. First, many types of rules could be used to regulate CFM. The
contractarian taxonomy of rule types illustrates that broad immutable rules
are not the only regulatory option. Second, there are potentially many types
of CFM. A mediator's fee could be based on the amount of settlement, the
fact of settlement, the costs saved, or the extent to which a mediator can help
the parties find otherwise overlooked opportunities to create value. Third,
despite this variety, existing regulations generally ban CFM using an
untailored, immutable rule. Many court rules and ethical guidelines bar any
sort of contingent fee without consideration as to the type or circumstances
of the fee arrangement. (Others ignore CFM, thus accepting it uncritically.)
The various rules prohibiting CFM would ban each of the four examples
discussed above. Percentage-of-settlement fees clearly are contingent on the
"amount of the settlement"--the greater the plaintiffs recovery, the greater
the mediator's fee. 1 7  Success fees are contingent on the "result of the
mediation,"1 8 or on the "outcome of the process." ' 19 Similarly, percentage-
of-cost-savings compensation and fees based on a percentage of value
113. COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 107, at M-17 (requiring that all expenses
of the mediation, other than witnesses for one side, be shared equally by the parties unless they
agree otherwise).
114. COMMERCIAL MEDIATION RULES R. 17 (American Arbitration Ass'n 1999), reprinted in
JOHN W. COOLEY, THE MEDIATOR'S HANDBOOK, ADVANCED PRACTICE GUIDE FOR CIVIL
LITIGATION app. F-1 (2000).
115. COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 107, at M-17.
116. CAMCA MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION RULES Art. 18 (Commercial Arbitration and
Mediation Ctr. for the Americas), at http://www.sice.oas.org/dispute/comarb/camca/cammarle
.asp#al8 (Mar. 15, 1996).
117. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
118. Id.
119. See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text (discussing various court rules employing
this language or language like it, such as "outcome of the mediation").
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created tum on the outcome of the mediation process; they are contingent on
the outcome of that process. Conversely, in states without CFM-related
regulations, each of these four examples would be permitted.
This untailored approach, whether restrictive or permissive, fails to take
into account the range of fee agreements that could potentially be considered
"contingent fees" in the mediation context or their different advantages and
disadvantages. Before arguing for such a tailored approach to CFM, Part II
lays the foundation for further analysis by making the case against CFM.
III. The Case Against CFM
Although CFM has rarely been discussed in the ADR literature,
120
examples from state and local regulations indicate that many practitioners,
judges, and mediation associations consider the practice improper. 121 But is
an untailored immutable ban on CFM justified? Are there social interests at
stake that must be protected using such a rule? Would allowing CFM in
some circumstances necessarily be inconsistent with the values fundamental
to mediation ethics? Although I ultimately argue in Part III that CFM should
be permitted in some circumstances, this Part makes the argument against
CFM-in some places, drawing upon existing treatments of the subject and,
in other areas, constructing the most plausible objections to the use of
contingent fees.
A. Bias
Critics charge that CFM will bias a mediator and undermine neutrality.
There is some merit to this claim. Like other agents, a mediator's incentives
differ from those of her clients, the parties to the mediation. 22 To the extent
that a mediator's fee structure exacerbates those differences, it may lead the
mediator to act against the parties' best interests.
The question, of course, is what one means by such words as neutrality
or bias. This subpart briefly describes the mediation profession's traditional
approach to neutrality. It is this classical conception of what neutrality
requires that provides the primary objection to CFM.
1. The Classical Conception of Mediator Neutrality.-Neutrality is
generally considered the sine qua non of mediation.123 Given its importance,
120. See supra note 15.
121. See supra notes 66-67, 70-71, 73, 76-77, 87-91.
122. On principal-agent problems in mediation, see Michael Watkins & Kim Winters,
Intervenors with Interests and Power, 13 NEGOT. J. 119, 137 (1997). On the principal-agent
problem generally, see PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 1-35 (John W.
Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985).
123. KOVACH, MEDIATION, supra note 57, at 123 (citing Barbara Filner & Michael Jenkins,
Performance Based Evaluation of Mediators: The San Diego Mediation Center's Experience, 30
U.S.F. L. REV. 647, 649 (1996)).
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however, few scholars have discussed what neutrality requires.'124 Text after
text exhorts mediators to remain neutral but offers little guidance on how to
accomplish this goal. One recent book states forcefully that "neutrality and
impartiality are the most important qualities of a mediator"' 25 but then offers
only half a page of discussion on what constitutes neutrality. 126 The advice
given is brief: "Don't engage in behaviors indicating prejudgment ....
Refrain from commenting favorably or unfavorably regarding the statements
of any party."'
127
Despite this shortage of analysis, one can discern a traditional
conception of neutrality in the mediation literature. Most define mediator
124. Id. See Alison Taylor, Concepts of Neutrality in Family Mediation: Contexts, Ethics,
Influence, and Transformative Process, 14 MEDIATION Q. 215, 217 (1997) [hereinafter Taylor,
Concepts of Neutrality] (noting a "dearth of writings" on neutrality). The best writings in this area
are Sarah Cobb & Janet Rifkin, Practice and Paradox: Deconstructing Neutrality in Mediation, 16
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 35 (1991) [hereinafter Cobb & Rifkin, Deconstructing Neutrality]
(advocating the adoption of a poststructural perspective of neutrality as a practice in discourse);
Judith L. Maute, Public Values and Private Justice: A Case for Mediator Accountability, 4 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 503, 505-08 (1991) (contemplating the relationship between mediator neutrality and
mediator accountability); and Sydney E. Bernard et al., The Neutral Mediator: Value Dilemmas in
Divorce Mediation, 4 MEDIATION Q. 61, 65-66 (1984) (discussing neutrality as a settlement
strategy for divorce mediators).
For a critique of the classical conception of neutrality, see David Dyck, The Mediator as Nonviolent
Advocate: Revisiting the Question of Mediator Neutrality, 18 MEDIATION Q. 129, 139 (2000)
("[T]his guiding notion [of neutrality] is essentially illusory. In the very act of promoting the
collaborative process that is intrinsic to mediation, the mediator becomes an advocate for a
particular process and against other types of processes (and of the outcomes that would naturally
result from those processes)."); Matthew A. Levitt, Kilometer 101: Oasis or Mirage? An Analysis
of Third-Party Self-Interest in International Mediation, 15 MEDIATION Q. 155, 155 (1997) ("In
reality, the myth of the scrupulously neutral mediator is just that-a myth."); and Christopher
Honeyman, Bias and Mediators' Ethics, 2 NEGOT. J. 175, 175-77 (1986) (arguing that traditional
mediation theory "creates a false image" of the neutrality of mediators and that accepting and
disclosing inevitable biases is needed). See also CONNIE J.A. BECK & BRUCE D. SALES, FAMILY
MEDIATION: FACTS, MYTHS, AND FUTURE PROSPECTS 42-45, 50-51 (2001) (arguing that no
mediator can really be unbiased); Susan S. Silbey, Mediation Mythology, 9 NEGOT. J. 349, 351
(1993) (contending that mediators cannot be normatively and procedurally neutral).
For the argument that overly formal conceptions of neutrality restrict mediators from correcting
power imbalances, see Isabelle R. Gunning, Diversity Issues in Mediation: Controlling Negative
Cultural Myths, 1995 J. DiSP. RESOL. 55, 80-81 (1995) (criticizing conceptions of neutrality that
forbid intervention to defeat the influence of negative cultural myths in the mediation process) and
Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation and the Politics of Power, 40 BUFF. L.
REV. 441, 515 (1992) (complaining that the ethic of neutrality precludes intervention by mediators
into the substance of financial agreements between parties to divorce). See also Russell Engler, And
Justice for All-Including the Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the Roles of the Judges, Mediators,
and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987, 1990 (1999) ("[T]he notion of impartiality should compel
judges and mediators to assist unrepresented parties, rather than prevent them from doing so.");
Judith L. Maute, Mediator Accountability: Responding to Fairness Concerns, 1990 J. DISP. RESOL.
347, 358 (1990) ("Unless mediation practice departs from the absolute commitment to neutrality it
may coerce settlement seriously at odds with societal norms.").
125. JOHN W. COOLEY, THE MEDIATOR'S HANDBOOK 28 (2000).
126. Id.
127. Id
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neutrality as treating the disputing parties equally. For example, many
mediation organizations focus on whether the mediator gives "scrupulous
attention to doing exactly equal to and for each disputant., 128 This is neutral-
ity defined as impartiality-the mediator must be even-handed and free from
bias. 129 Similarly, the Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators require that
a mediator act as an "impartial third party."' 130  Commentators note that
achieving impartiality generally requires that mediators avoid "displays of
bias, favoritism, or prejudice."' 13 1  The Ethical Guidelines for Mediators,
published by the Association of Attorney-Mediators, define impartiality as
"freedom from favoritism or bias in word, action, and appearance[;] it
implies a commitment to aid all parties in reaching a settlement."1
32
Impartiality is seen as important for several reasons. First, impartiality
is pragmatically necessary to make mediation effective. If a mediator is
biased towards one party, the other party may distrust the mediator. The
favored party may feel strengthened in its position by the mediator's assis-
tance or alliance, and that party may refuse to concede or to negotiate. The
disfavored party may similarly dig in, either because it feels slighted or in
order to counter the mediator's efforts on behalf of the favored party. In
addition, one or both parties may be reluctant to share information with the
mediator, for fear that the mediator will use that information against them.
133
Such distrust and recalcitrance may lead to a bargaining impasse, making the
dispute more, rather than less, difficult to resolve.
Second, impartiality towards the parties' perspectives and concerns
allows the mediator to add value to the parties' negotiation process.
Disputing parties are often subject to various emotions and cognitive and
social psychological biases that distort their thinking and entrench them in
their positions. 134 A mediator, by contrast, can often escape such biases.
Because the mediator is not advocating for one side or the other, the mediator
128. Taylor, Concepts of Neutrality, supra note 124, at 218.
129. See KOVACH, MEDIATION, supra note 57, at 124-25 (discussing various definitions of
neutrality and impartiality). But see JOSEPH B. STULBERG, TAKING CHARGE/MANAGING
CONFLICT 37 (1987) (listing separately and thus implicitly distinguishing the definitions of
impartiality-"treat[ing] all parties in comparable ways, both procedurally and substantively"--and
neutrality--"hav[ing] no personal preference that the dispute be resolved in one way rather than
another").
130. MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS, supra note 5,14.
131. Claudia L. Hale & Chris Nix, Achieving Neutrality and Impartiality: The Ultimate
Communication Challenge for Peer Mediators, 14 MEDIATION Q. 337, 340 (1997).
132. ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR MEDIATORS § 3 (Ass'n of Attorney-Mediators), at http://www.
attorney-mediators.org/ethics.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2003). The Center for Dispute Resolution's
Code of Professional Conduct for Mediators similarly defines impartiality as "freedom from bias or
favoritism either in word or action." CODE OF PROF'L CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS § 2 (Ctr. for
Dispute Resolution 1982), reprinted in JAY FOLBERG & ALISON TAYLOR, MEDIATION: A
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO RESOLVING CONFLICTS WITHOUT LITIGATION 349, 351 (1984).
133. See generally Watkins & Winters, supra note 122, at 130 (noting the importance of
perceived impartiality in eliciting trust from the parties).
134. See infra notes 157-62 and accompanying text.
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may be more objective and rational in her thinking than the parties. By
virtue of the mediator's third-party perspective, the mediator may be able to
see solutions that the parties cannot. If the mediator relinquishes her
neutrality, she may forgo these advantages and be less able to assist the
parties.
Third, neutrality is considered fundamental to the self-determination for
which mediation strives. To the extent that a mediator is biased towards one
party, the mediator may undermine the parties' ability to craft their own
solution to their problem. Unless the parties primarily shape the mediation
process, it may be used to impose an outcome upon them that conflicts with
their own vision of how their dispute should best be handled.
This concern for self-determination is in tension, of course, with the
mediator's own normative judgments about the parties' decisions. In certain
contexts, such as divorce mediation, this tension may lead a mediator to want
to intervene on behalf of a less powerful party to ensure a fair outcome or to
balance power between the disputants. But the classical conception assumes
that mediators will remain "neutral" to permit parties to determine for
themselves what outcome they desire. In other words, the classical
conception assumes a second type of neutrality that augments neutrality as
impartiality; this type of neutrality requires that a mediator suppress her own
preferences and point of view in order to remain neutral vis-A-vis the parties
and their interests. 135  In perhaps the most comprehensive treatment of
neutrality to date, Cobb and Rifkin argue that the traditional view of
impartiality requires the "absence of feelings, values, or agendas.'
136
In many instances, these two sorts of neutrality are coextensive; a
mediator's preferences inherently bias the mediator toward one party or the
other. 137  In such instances, the mediator has what I will call a "biasing
interest," an interest that inherently leads to partiality toward one party. If a
mediator has a prior relationship with one party, for example, she may sym-
pathize with that party and thus begin to favor it in the mediation. Neutrality
as self-disinterest requires the mediator to keep those sympathies in check in
order to remain impartial.
In other instances, neutrality as impartiality and neutrality as self-
disinterest may not be so intertwined. For example, a mediator might be self-
interested vis-A-vis the outcome of the mediation because she wants the dis-
135. Cf William P. Smith, Effectiveness of the Biased Mediator, 1 NEGOT. J. 363, 364 (1985)
(discussing the importance of perceived mediator "[i]ndifference toward the parties' positions").
136. Cobb & Ritkin, Deconstructing Neutrality, supra note 124, at 42.
137. Cf Joel Kurtzberg & Jamie Henikoff, Freeing the Parties From the Law: Designing an
Interest and Rights Focused Model of Landlord/Tenant Mediation, 1997 J. DISP. RESOL. 53, 81-82
(1997) (defining objective neutrality as the "mediator's obligation not to permit her own biases and
feelings towards either of the disputants to affect her ability to act in a fair, impartial manner during
the mediation").
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pute to settle to increase her settlement rate and thereby bolster her
reputation. She is not neutral in the sense of being purely self-disinterested.
At the same time, her self-interest may not inherently bias her toward one
party or the other. She may be impartial as between their interests. She
simply wants the case to settle, but she does not care whether either party
benefits more because of settlement. In such a case, the mediator has no
biasing interest even though she is not purely self-disinterested.
2. The Conflict Between CFM and the Classical Conception.-
Mediators are scrutinized for several indicators of biasing interests. For
example, most mediation ethics codes require that a mediator be free from
traditional conflicts of interest, such as a prior relationship with one of the
disputing parties. 138 Similarly, the profession assumes that a financial stake
in the outcome of a mediation will create a biasing interest that undermines
impartiality.
139
This brings us back to the common prohibition on CFM. According to
the classical conception of neutrality, contingent fees should be prohibited
because of the threat they pose to both types of neutrality. A contingent fee
will undermine neutrality as self-disinterest because it gives the mediator an
incentive to settle the parties' case on certain terms. The assumption is that
138. See CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW & ELIZABETH PLAPINGER, CPR INSTITUTE FOR DISPUTE
RESOLUTION, PROPOSED MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR THE LAWYER AS THIRD
PARTY NEUTRAL § 4.5.3 (b)(1)(ii), at http://www.cpradr.org/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2003), reprinted
in COOLEY, supra note 125, app. I, at 16 (recommending that mediators begin mediations by
confirming the lack of any prior relationship with either party). The requirement that a mediator
disclose all prior business relationships is also commonly used in the arbitration arena to determine
whether an arbitrator is biased. See Jennifer C. Bailey, Note, The Search to Clarify an Elusive
Standard: What Relationships Between Arbitrator and Party Demonstrate Evident Partiality?, 2000
J. DISP. RESOL. 153, 158 (2000) (discussing this common requirement); see also Carole Silver,
Models of Quality for Third Parties in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 37, 49-57 (1996) (reviewing common restrictions on prior relationships).
Some have gone farther to argue that, even without an established prior relationship, a mediator
sometimes shares a class or group identification with one of the parties or, that the mediator may
experience antipathy or sympathy for one of the parties. See, e.g., Robert A. Baruch Bush, The
Dilemmas of Mediation Practice: A Study of Ethical Dilemmas and Policy Implications, 1994 J.
DISP. RESOL. 1, 12 (1994). This may make it difficult for the mediator to remain impartial and may
lead the other party to question the mediator's neutrality. Some ethics codes have thus prohibited
such conflicts. The Code of Professional Conduct for Mediators adopted by the Center for Dispute
Resolution, for example, defines neutrality as requiring that a mediator "reveal all monetary,
psychological, emotional, associational, or authoritative affiliations that he or she has with any of
the parties to a dispute that might cause a conflict of interest or affect the perceived or actual
neutrality of the professional in the performance of duties." CODE OF PROF'L CONDUCT FOR
MEDIATORS § 2 (Ctr. for Dispute Resolution 1982), reprinted in JAY FOLBERG & ALISON TAYLOR,
MEDIATION: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO RESOLVING CONFLICTS WITHOUT LITIGATION 349,
350 (1984).
139. MENKEL-MEADOW & PLAPINGER, supra note 138, § 4.5.3 (b)(1)(i). This is also true in
arbitration. In reviewing arbitral awards for partiality, courts often examine whether the arbitrator
had a financial stake in the outcome. See Elizabeth A. Murphy, Standards of Arbitrator
Impartiality: How Impartial Must They Be?, 1996 J. DISP. RESOL. 463, 470 (1996).
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CFM also creates a biasing interest that the mediator cannot be expected, or
trusted, to control. This interest will compromise neutrality as impartiality
because the mediator's stake in the outcome will lead her to favor one party
or the other to achieve greater financial gain. This logic dictates that CFM
should be categorically banned.
Consider a percentage-of-settlement contingent fee. If a mediator were
to intervene in settling a personal injury suit using a percentage-of-settlement
fee (such that the higher the settlement, the greater the mediator's
compensation), the percentage fee would undermine the mediator's
commitment to neutrality. Rather than seek the best possible agreement for
the parties or merely facilitate the parties' resolution of their dispute, the
mediator would be biased towards those agreements that secure the mediator
a greater fee-which would necessarily be those favoring the plaintiff. As
Andrew Niebler has commented, "[c]ontingent fees may ... be offensive to
the very notion of a third party neutral.'
' 40
In this personal injury example, the mediator's fee is based directly on
the amount of settlement. The mediator thus has obvious reason to inflate
the settlement amount or ally with the plaintiff in such inflation. Such bias
toward one party to the other party's detriment conflicts with neutrality as
impartiality and inherently gives rise to a biasing interest.
I will argue below, however, that in some cases the classical conception
has assumed that CFM will create biasing interests when it may not. The
traditional approach has conflated neutrality as impartiality with neutrality as
self-disinterest, assuming that one can only be truly impartial if one is also
completely self-disinterested. I will contend that in some instances a media-
tor can be self-interested-he can have strong beliefs about the outcome and
even a financial stake in the outcome-without sacrificing impartiality.
B. Other Concerns About CFM
In addition to worrying that CFM will undermine a mediator's
neutrality, critics have raised several other concerns. These include concern
that contingent fees will distort the mediation process, weaken party self-
determination, and create an appearance of impropriety.' 4 '
1. Process Distortion.-In addition to biasing a mediator toward one
party, CFM may distort the mediation process in harmful ways. For
example, many mediators take an interest-based approach to mediation,
attempting to help the parties find a resolution that addresses their interests
140. Niebler, Optimal Compensation, supra note 15, at 180.
141. Some may also be concerned that CFM exposes mediators to exploitation by unscrupulous
parties. I address this issue later. See infra Part V.
258 [Vol. 82:227
Contractarian Economics and Mediation Ethics
and needs as conceived broadly.1 42 This examination of the parties' underly-
ing concerns can sometimes uncover creative solutions the parties might
otherwise overlook. Mediation can help the parties to overcome impasses
and to find value-creating resolutions to their dispute.
1 43
If a mediator is paid on a contingent fee basis, the mediator may have
less concern for such a broad examination of the parties' interests. Instead,
the mediator may focus narrowly on the monetary issues at stake.' 44 If the
contingent fee compensates the mediator based on the amount of settlement,
the mediator may not attend to intangible interests (such as hurt feelings) and
resolution devices (such as apology) that address them.
45
As indicated in the above hypotheticals, CFM need not necessarily tie
the mediator's compensation to the settlement amount. For example, a bonus
for successful settlement might increase the mediator's fee so long as some
settlement occurred. Even in such cases, however, CFM might distort the
mediation process. A mediator working under such a fee arrangement might
be more aggressive than she would otherwise be. The mediator might push
for settlement even when settlement is not in the parties' best interests. She
might send the parties unjustifiably optimistic signals about the chances of
settling their case, in hopes of prolonging the mediation and providing
additional opportunities to settle. 1
46
Similarly, if a contingent fee were tied to the cost savings created by
mediation, the mediator might be overly eager to reduce such costs. The
mediator might try to force early settlement. To do so, the mediator might
become more evaluative than she would otherwise become, again forgoing
in-depth exploration of the parties' interests in favor of a quick resolution of
their dispute. 1
47
142. See, e.g., Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations, Strategies and
Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, I HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 7, 19-23 (1996) [hereinafter
Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations].
143. On problem solving in dispute resolution, see generally ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL.,
BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 97-126 (2000)
[hereinafter MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING].
144. Various scholars have also noted that, when attorneys participating in a mediation are
working on a contingent fee, those attorneys may advocate for monetary settlement terms and
against nonmonetary, but potentially integrative, terms. See, e.g., Dwight Golann, Is Legal
Mediation a Process of Repair-or Separation? An Empirical Study, and Its Implications, 7 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 301, 330 (2002) (reporting empirical findings where mediators claimed that fee
arrangements influence lawyers in mediation and that "lawyers are more likely to obstruct
relationship-based solutions if they are working under a contingency fee agreement").
145. On the role of apology in litigation and mediation, see Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising
Clients to Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REv. 1009, 1036-39 (1999) (exploring the complexities of
apology and arguing that mediation can allow parties to reach this often valuable solution).
146. On the problem of sending such false signals for personal gain, see Michael L. Moffitt,
Will This Case Settle? An Exploration of Mediators'Predictions, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.
39, 70 (2000) (considering situations in which a mediator might "make misrepresentations to the
parties in order to advance her own personal interests at the expense of the parties' interests").
147. See Niebler, Optimal Compensation, supra note 15, at 179.
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2. Weakened Party Self-Determination.-CFM can also be attacked for
undermining party self-determination. Mediation proponents have long
advocated the process for promoting self-determination by allowing parties
to work through their problems on their own terms. Unlike adjudication,
mediation-particularly if the mediator is more facilitative than directive-
gives the parties control over the process they use and the outcome at which
they arrive. The mediator theoretically has neither authority to impose a par-
ticular settlement nor any interest that would bias the mediator to do so.
A contingent fee changes that to some degree. As Carrie Menkel-
Meadow has noted, "[t]o the extent that mediators have an 'interest' in
settling a dispute, settlement, rather than what is fair or just, may become the
mediator's goal and parties may not be fully apprised of the consequences of
their conclusions, and 'consent' to settlement may not be real."' 148 This out-
come is certainly plausible. If a mediator takes a stake in a dispute through a
percentage-of-settlement fee or a success fee, the mediator may be so
motivated to push the parties in a particular direction that the mediated
outcome can no longer be considered party-driven or self-determined.
Instead, the mediator's own interests may drive the process, as described
above. This may weaken party self-determination and thereby weaken the
mediator's claim to legitimacy.
3. Appearance of Impropriety.-Finally, CFM may create an
appearance of impropriety, even if it does not so bias a mediator as to lead to
the undesirable consequences described in the previous subparts. Many of
the ethics codes for mediators described in Part I contain injunctions to avoid
creating an appearance of impropriety or bias. 149 Beyond merely avoiding
bias or conflicts of interest, a mediator must maintain the profession's repu-
tation by appearing neutral at all times. 150
The "appearance of impropriety" standard is applied most commonly in
court-connected mediations in which a mediator serves as an officer of the
court. One can certainly imagine the standard applying to private dispute
resolution as well. CFM may cast a shadow on the mediation process,
148. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 57, at 446.
149. See, e.g., ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR MEDIATORS § 3 cmt. a (State Bar of Tex. Alternative
Dispute Resolution Section), at http://www.texasadr.org/ethicalguidelines.cfm (last modified Dec.
26, 2001) (noting that mediators should avoid the appearance of impropriety regarding fees "in
court-ordered mediations").
150. See Kurtzberg & Henikoff, supra note 137, at 81-82 (referring to "subjective neutrality"
as the parties' perception of the mediator's neutrality); see also Matthew David Disco, Note, The
Impression of Possible Bias: What a Neutral Arbitrator Must Disclose in California, 45 HASTINGS
L.J. 113, 136-37 (1993) (discussing the California standards regarding the appearance of neutrality
for contractual arbitrators).
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making parties and observers question the mediator's ability to serve as an
impartial facilitator of the parties' attempts to resolve their dispute.
IV. The Case for CFM
Parts I and II illustrate the tendency for those within the mediation
profession to assume that contingent fee mediation is a contradiction in
terms; if a third party is compensated in a contingent fashion, the third party
can no longer be sufficiently neutral to be considered a true mediator. Most
mediation guidelines incorporate this assumption and bar CFM. 151 Although
there are many states in which CFM remains unregulated, the lack of regula-
tion is generally due to immaturity in mediation regulation rather than to a
considered decision that CFM is worthwhile.
The primary case for an immutable prohibition of CFM rests on the
argument that CFM will undermine a mediator's neutrality and hurt the
mediation process. To argue for CFM, therefore, requires answering several
questions. First, what is it about neutrality that we value and must protect?
Put differently, what function does neutrality serve in mediation? Second,
does CFM actually conflict with this understanding of neutrality? And
finally, does CFM serve any independent purpose of its own? This Part
explores these questions in turn.
A. Reconsidering the Classical Conception of Neutrality
The classical conception of neutrality requires both impartiality and
self-disinterest. In extreme form, it imagines a mediator almost empty of
belief or commitment. Is this extreme necessary? To answer this question,
we must reconsider what basic social interest we seek to protect by requiring
mediators to remain neutral. The answer, as indicated in Part II's discussion
of the classical conception of neutrality, is that neutrality is seen as necessary
to make mediation possible. Without it, parties will not share information
with a mediator or turn to a mediator for help in overcoming barriers to
settlement.
This justification for neutrality is functional. It rests on an asserted need
to protect the critical functions of a mediator. But most discussions of
neutrality have not explored the functional connection between neutrality and
mediation. 15' Is the classical conception necessary to protect the core func-
tions of a mediator? Taking the classical conception on its own terms, does a
functional analysis necessarily lead to the conclusion that CFM is harmful?
151. See, e.g., ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR MEDIATORS § 3 (State Bar of Tex. Alternative
Dispute Resolution Section), at http://www.texasadr.org/ethicalguidelines.cfin (last modified Dec.
26, 2001) ("A mediator shall not charge a contingent fee or a fee based upon the outcome of the
mediation.").
152. See KOVACH, MEDIATION, supra note 57, at 99 ("Neutrality remains primarily
unresearched in the scholarly literature.").
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My answer is simple: it does not. To make this argument, this Part asks
two sets of questions. First, how does a mediator add value to two-party
bargaining? Put differently, what does a mediator do that negotiating parties
cannot do for themselves; what are a mediator's core functions? Second,
what sort of neutrality is required to permit a mediator to perform such
functions? In other words, how impartial and self-disinterested must a
mediator be to help parties negotiate?
1. The Mediator's Bargaining Functions.-The first question explores
how a third-party mediator adds value to direct, party-to-party, unassisted
bargaining. What is it that a mediator does, and why are disputing parties
better off with a mediator than without one? This question is difficult, and I
have taken it up in detail elsewhere. 153 For brevity's sake, I will answer it as
follows; mediators add value to parties' bargaining in at least three ways: by
discovering whether settlement is possible, by optimizing settlement, and by
helping to manage psychological, emotional, and relational barriers to
settlement.
First, a mediator can compare private information and determine
whether settlement is possible. Negotiation failures often result from infor-
mation asymmetries between the parties. Neither party knows on what terms
the other is willing to settle. As a result, each makes extreme offers and
demands to avoid being "taken." Such extremism may lead to bargaining
breakdown. 154 The parties may never discover that a deal is possible-that a
bargaining zone exists in which the defendant, for example, is willing to pay
more than the minimum amount that the plaintiff demands. A mediator can
help the parties to overcome these information asymmetries.155 The mediator
can receive confidential information from each party and compare offers and
demands to determine whether settlement is possible. If each side can trust
that the mediator will not share their confidences with the other party, each
side can make unobservable concessions to test the water. This sharing gives
the mediator enough information to determine whether settlement is possible
without revealing either parties' cards to the other side. The mediator can
thus add value to the parties' bargaining.
Second, assuming some settlement is possible, a mediator can uncover
and compare information to help the parties optimize their settlement. The
153. See Scott R. Peppet, Contract Formation in Imperfect Markets: Should We Use Mediators
in Deals? 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. (forthcoming 2003). See generally RUSSELL KOROBKIN,
NEGOTIATION THEORY AND STRATEGY 343-56 (2002); HOWARD RAIFFA ET AL., NEGOTIATION
ANALYSIS: THE SCIENCE AND ART OF COLLABORATIVE DECISION MAKING 317-19 (2002).
154. See MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING, supra note 143, at 112-18; Jennifer Gerarda
Brown & Ian Ayres, Economic Rationales for Mediation, 80 VA. L. REV. 323, 336-40 (1994)
[hereinafter Brown & Ayres, Economic Rationales].
155. Brown & Ayres, Economic Rationales, supra note 154, at 394.
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basic problem is simple; sometimes parties reach an agreement, but the
agreement is inefficient because it leaves possible gains from trade
undiscovered.156  A divorcing couple might, for example, agree to share
custody of their children using a traditional visitation arrangement whereby
each parent has the children every other Thanksgiving or every other winter
holiday. This arrangement might be better than reaching no agreement at all,
but it might not be as good for either party as a more tailored custody decree
that permitted the father to keep the children each Christmas (which he
would value because of his family's long-standing tradition of celebrating
Christmas together) and the mother to vacation with the kids for two weeks
every summer at their father's ranch.
A mediator can help the parties optimize their settlement by again
comparing information the parties might not disclose to each other but may
reveal to the mediator. Whereas each parent in this example might be reluc-
tant to reveal his or her true interests for fear of exploitation by the other
side, it would be rational for each to tell the mediator in hopes that the
mediator could use the information to make each better off. By interviewing
each party in private and looking for trades, a mediator can find efficient
options for settlement.
Third, a mediator can add value by managing psychological, emotional,
and relational barriers to settlement. For example, scholars have identified
various cognitive and social psychological biases that complicate dispute
resolution. 57  Disputing parties often have self-serving assessments of
fairness; 58 they may suffer from "reactive devaluation" and devalue an
opponent's offer merely because the offer comes from the opponent (as
opposed to a third party). 59 Their judgments may be biased by framing
effects and a preference for the status quo. 160  Others have reviewed these
psychological phenomena in detail and suggested that a mediator might help
156. An agreement is Pareto efficient if there is no other possible agreement that can make one
party better off without making another party worse off. See, e.g., HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND
SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 139, 156-64 (1982).
157. See MAX H. BAZERMAN & MARGARET A. NEALE, NEGOTIATING RATIONALLY 2 (1992)
(listing seven decisionmaking biases that stifle negotiations); JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
HEURISTICS AND BIASES 20 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) (explaining various heuristics that
apply to conflict resolution); Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to
Litigation Settlement: An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REV. 107, 160-64 (1994)
(examining various psychological barriers and concluding that "avoiding psychological barriers ex
post is quite difficult").
158. See, e.g., Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The
Role of Self-Serving Biases, II J. ECON. PERSP. 109, 119 (1997) (discussing several studies in labor
negotiation and arbitration and concluding that "when there are numerous potential comparison
groups to assess fairness, the parties focus on those that favor themselves").
159. See, e.g., Lee Ross, Reactive Devaluation in Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, in
BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 26, 34 (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995).
160. See, e.g., Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing
the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1104-13 (2000).
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parties to manage them.161 For our purposes, the point is that sometimes
parties are myopic; they cannot resolve their dispute unassisted because of
psychological and emotional issues that are fueling their conflict. A media-
tor can help to manage these issues by providing a detached perspective on
the dispute and helping the parties to examine their thinking and
assumptions. Sometimes a mediator can help the parties to rebuild or re-
analyze their relationship and to overcome hostilities, misperceptions, and
resentments that may have fueled their conflict. 1
62
2. Redefining Neutrality.-Given these basic functions, a second
question follows naturally: what sort of neutrality is required to permit a
mediator to serve parties in these ways? For example, how must a mediator
be neutral in order to help parties discover if settlement is possible? How
must a mediator be neutral in order to help parties optimize their settlement?
How must a mediator be neutral in order to help parties overcome
psychological and emotional barriers to agreement?
The first point is that a mediator needs to remain impartial to be able to
fulfill her role. Each of these three functions---discovering settlement,
optimizing settlement, and overcoming psychological and emotional
barriers-requires that the parties trust the mediator to keep information
private if necessary. The mediator can only benefit the parties as an
information conduit if the parties give her more information than they would
give each other. They will do so only to the extent that they trust her impar-
tiality and know that the mediator will not use the information against
them. 63 Similarly, parties will only accept a mediator's perspective on their
dispute as more objective than their own, and thus use the mediator to over-
come psychological and emotional barriers to settlement, if they trust that the
mediator is impartial. 164 Therefore, I agree with the classical conception of
neutrality to the extent that it recognizes the importance of impartiality.
161. E.g., Richard Birke & Craig R. Fox, Psychological Principles in Negotiating Civil
Settlements, 4 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 1, 49 (1999) (suggesting that a mediator can help parties
overcome psychological barriers to settlement).
162. The transformational mediation literature has elevated this aspect of mediation to primary
importance. E.g., ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION:
RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION 81-188 (1994).
Although I do not place quite as much importance on this aspect of a mediator's role, I do think that
relationship management is one of a mediator's core functions. For a more in-depth discussion of
the relational issues that mediators can help to manage, see Scott R. Peppet, Contract Formation in
Imperfect Markets: Should We Use Mediators in Deals? (forthcoming 2003).
163. Michelle D. Gaines, A Proposed Conflict of Interest Rule for Attorney-Mediators, 73
WASH. L. REv. 699, 702-03 (1998).
164. Jean R. Sternlight, Lawyer's Representation of Clients in Mediation: Using Economics
and Psychology to Structure Advocacy in a Nonadversarial Setting, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISp. RESOL.
269, 274, 336-39 (1999).
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This requirement of impartiality does not mean that a mediator must
treat each party identically. The mediator is not obligated to share all or the
same information with each party. Indeed, as discussed above, this restric-
tion would end the mediator's role as a manager of information exchange.
Nor does it mean that the mediator must necessarily give each party equal air
time, equal time in caucus, or follow any other mechanical rule to ensure
equal treatment. Instead, the mediator must strive to avoid partiality in order
to maintain sufficient trust to be able to perform the three core functions of
discovering settlement, optimizing settlement, and overcoming psychological
barriers to settlement.
This standard is necessarily somewhat amorphous, but it is not
completely without bite. It requires that a mediator avoid biasing interests-
those interests, beliefs, or commitments that will inherently compromise
impartiality and erode trust.
Put differently, a mediator must do only those things that neither party
could reasonably reject-those things that are in the parties' joint interests.
165
Thus, a mediator's impartiality is not compromised by sharing information
selectively or even by agreeing to keep certain information completely
confidential as between the parties because selective disclosure may be
necessary to permit the mediator to determine whether a settlement is
possible. A mediator should also be able to work with one party for a longer
time, or more intensively, to discover that party's interests, preferences, and
priorities, if additional time will result in the disclosure of sufficient infor-
mation to the mediator to permit settlement optimization. Finally, a mediator
should be allowed to "sanitize" information flow between the parties to
dampen emotional conflict or to "reality test" one party to help that party
consider whether its fairness assessments are unduly self-serving.166 Each of
these actions may be necessary to fulfill the mediator's core functions-
functions that serve both parties.
The second, and critical, point is that a mediator need not be completely
disinterested vis-A-vis these basic functions. Impartiality is not sacrificed
merely because the parties know that the mediator is seeking to discover if
settlement is possible, nor because the mediator is committed to finding an
optimal or efficient settlement. That the mediator has interests and beliefs
165. I loosely borrow this formulation from Thomas Scanlon. See T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE
OWE TO EACH OTHER 189-97 (1998) (using the "reasonably reject" formulation as part of his
contractualist approach to moral theory). I hesitate to even cite to Scanlon's contractualism,
however, for fear that readers will unknowingly conflate it with the contractarian economic
approach to mediation and legal ethics I am advocating here. There are, I think, connections
between the two, and it is a provocative question to consider their interplay. That, however, is a
topic for another day.
166. See generally CRISTINA CASANOVA, MEDIATION FOR SCHOOL COUNSELORS (PART XIV):
THE PROCESS OF MEDIATION II, at http://www.guidancechannel.com/detail.asp?index=907%
20&cat=19 (last visited Oct. 8, 2003) (advising mediators to "[s]anitize the [parties'] language so
that negative comments are translated into general neutral comments"); KOVACH, MEDIATION,
supra note 57, at 33 (discussing the mediator's function of "reality testing" the parties' positions).
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regarding these three core mediative functions does not conflict with neutral-
ity as I conceive of it. Indeed, I make the normative claim that mediators
should seek to help parties discover whether settlement is possible, find
efficient or optimizing settlements, and manage relational and psychological
barriers to settlement.
A normative commitment to these three core functions seems legitimate
to me for two reasons. First, because the parties cannot do these things for
themselves, no paternalism is involved in assisting the parties in these ways.
The mediator furthers these goals because the parties cannot achieve them
without third-party assistance. This thought is tied to the second source of
legitimacy: the parties' consent to the mediation process. The mediator seeks
to fulfill these three functions because that is what the parties have hired the
mediator to do. Each of these three functions generally cannot be
accomplished without a mediator. Thus, although the mediator is not
completely self-disinterested-she has normative commitments to fulfilling
these three core functions-her commitments are grounded in the parties'
needs.
Parties might need or consent to third-party assistance that goes beyond
these three core services. For example, two disputing parties might want a
mediator's assistance addressing power imbalances or fairness concerns.
The parties might, ex ante, know that without third-party assistance they
could arrive at a lopsided outcome, and they may fear that such a resolution
of their dispute will be short-lived and subject to criticism. They might thus
enlist the mediator's help as a fairness monitor, authorizing the mediator to
redress fairness concerns throughout the process. But disputing parties do
not necessarily need an impartial mediator to manage power imbalances.
They could just as easily seek assistance from partisan advisors, such as
counsel, in order to ensure that their settlement is in line with legal or com-
munity standards. Although this role is one that a mediator can play, it is not
a role that only a mediator can play.
167
167. Disputing parties might similarly seek evaluation of their claim by their mediator. Similar
to the debate over whether a mediator should intervene to redress power imbalances, some have
questioned whether neutrality requires that a mediator suppress her own views about the value of
the parties' dispute or how best to resolve it. For example, adherents to the classical conception
have argued that an "evaluative" mediation approach, in which the mediator offers her opinion on
the value of the parties' litigation, sacrifices neutrality as impartiality. See Levin, supra note 26, at
277 ("[O]ne may ponder the propriety of the practice of evaluative mediation in regard to an
impartiality standard."). Others have argued that it does not. See James H. Stark, The Ethics of
Mediation Evaluation: Some Troublesome Questions and Tentative Proposals, From an Evaluative
Lawyer Mediator, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 769, 796 (1997) ("To my mind, the mediator who provides
the parties the same access to legal information and advice-without favoritism or bias, and without
regard for the potential effect of the information on the prospects for settlement-is being impartial,
in the truest sense of the word."). This rebuttal argues that so long as the mediator remains neutral
vis-A-vis the parties-providing both sides with the same information, for example-the mediator
has in no way abandoned neutrality by offering her own opinion of the value of the parties' cases.
Id.
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Without explicit consent to such assistance, therefore, I believe that a
mediator should pause before intervening in these ways out of her own
concerns or beliefs about the parties' best interests. 168 The threat of
paternalism looms large. The mediator should ask herself whether both
parties would be likely to consent to the mediator's action were they fully
informed about that action and its intention. If no such consent would likely
be forthcoming from the parties, the mediator should recognize that such an
intervention would likely sacrifice impartiality and trust. 1
69
In some ways, my approach is closest to that of Gibson, Thompson, and
Bazerman.170  These authors, writing from a perspective derived from the
negotiation analytics of Howard Raiffa, argue that "[i]nappropriate
agreements are frequently achieved as a result of mediator preoccupation
with neutrality.' 17' Dismissing the traditional assumption that mediators
must completely suppress their opinions about the relative merits of various
proposed settlements, Gibson, Thompson, and Bazerman argue for an
approach based on "symmetric prescriptive advice" or SPA. This approach
requires the neutral to be active and to serve both parties' interests. 
1 72
These authors likewise argue that a mediator should be committed to
three basic propositions. First, the parties should reach agreement only if
both can be better off through agreement than through nonagreement.
Second, agreements should be maximally efficient. Third, the parties should
fully consider issues of distributional fairness. 73 They argue that "mediators
should not be neutral, in the sense of being value free .... [W]e advocate,
My approach to this question differs from either of these; it turns on the reason for the evaluation.
If the parties have shared information fully and could evaluate their case themselves-or have their
lawyers do so-then there is no reason for a mediator to offer her opinion. If, however, the parties
cannot evaluate the case themselves because they refuse to share sufficient information about the
facts of the case to make evaluation meaningful, then a mediator may be necessary for evaluation.
This is merely a subset of the ways in which a mediator can help parties overcome information
asymmetries and discover whether settlement is possible.
168. My approach thus differs from some critics of the classical conception who have called for
mediator intervention to address power imbalances. See sources cited supra note 124.
169. Lea Brilmayer of the Yale Law School has similarly discussed the problems of mediator
interventionism and self-interest. Like my argument, Professor Brilmayer concludes that the
solution to these problems is mediation's voluntary nature. The fact that mediation is voluntary and
consensual reduces the moral load upon it-the mediator may act out of self-interest, at least in part,
but the parties' consent to the mediation process and its outcome sanitizes the end result. See Lea
Brilmayer, America: The World's Mediator?, 51 ALA. L. REV. 715, 725 (2000).
170. Kevin Gibson, Leigh Thompson & Max H. Bazerman, Shortcomings of Neutrality in
Mediation: Solutions Based on Rationality, 12 NEGOT. J. 69 (1996).
171. Id. at69.
172. Id. at 70 ("The SPA approach means that the mediator will remain impartial, but may no
longer claim to be completely neutral.").
173. Id. at 72-73.
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instead,.., that mediators assist negotiators in reaching rational [i.e.,
efficient] outcomes."' 174 According to Gibson, Thompson, and Bazerman,
the practice of mediation is currently obstructed by a herd of sacred
cows, in the guise of 'mediator neutrality' .... We propose that
mediators should be acknowledged as impartial interveners in
disputes, and that their intervention is aimed at promoting rational
outcomes by, among other things, reducing bias and promoting
optimal settlements.' 
75
I obviously agree that mediators should make normative commitments
along the lines of those that Gibson, Thompson, and Bazerman describe.
Their argument, however, stops short because they do not provide an argu-
ment for the legitimacy of their three propositions. My approach differs from
theirs because it focuses on how a mediator can help parties in ways they
cannot help themselves. This criterion separates permissible mediator
commitments from paternalistic ones. Although substantively I agree with
the three propositions they put forth, 176 I am as concerned with explaining
why a mediator is justified in having these commitments as I am about their
content.
A third question raised by this approach concerns the sort of party
consent that justifies a mediator's violation of the classical conception of
neutrality as strict self-disinterest and impartiality.
I have assumed to this point that, going into a mediation, the parties
understand that these three core functions are what allow a mediator to add
value above and beyond the parties' unassisted bargaining process. In other
words, I have assumed that the fact that two parties consent to mediation
means that they have consented to the mediator fulfilling these three
functions, rather than the mediator staying completely devoid of commitment
or purpose. This assumption is, of course, a fiction: many parties will
174. Kevin Gibson, Leigh Thompson & Max H. Bazerman, Biases and Rationality in the
Mediation Process, in APPLICATIONS OF HEURISTICS AND BIASES TO SOCIAL ISSUES 163, 166
(Linda Heath et al. eds., 1994). See also id. at 179 (arguing that although mediators "can strive for
even-handedness in their dealings.... we believe they should also endorse efficient outcomes").
175. Id. at 180. See also John Forester & David Stitzel, Beyond Neutrality: The Possibilities of
Activist Mediation in Public Sector Conflicts, 5 NEGOT. J. 251, 261 (1989) ("Properly understood,
theoretically and practically, mediation promises not neutrality but 'both gain' outcomes for
disputing parties.").
176. Their first two propositions parallel mine. Their third proposition-regarding fairness-
differs, but it can be incorporated within my third function of managing psychological barriers to
resolution. As discussed above, see supra note 158 and accompanying text, much research
indicates that parties are often unable to make objective assessments of fairness. A mediator can
thus serve a useful role as a check on self-serving fairness judgments. This purpose is somewhat
different than the activism critique's desire for mediators to intervene to redress power imbalances;
here the focus is on intervention to address self-serving (and often unintentional) psychological
biases (as opposed to self-serving-but intentional-strategic moves).
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consent to mediation-or be ordered into it-without having even minimal
understanding of the mediator's role or function.
The mediator faces a choice. One option is to seek actual party consent
to this approach to neutrality. Before each mediation, a mediator could
explain the ways in which she works and the ways in which she might help
the parties. She could explain that the parties should not expect strict
equality, nor even self-disinterest. Instead, she could explain that she would
be working in the parties' joint interest to discover settlement, optimize
settlement, and help the parties manage psychological and relational barriers
to settlement. With this framework established, the mediator could seek con-
sent to stray from the classical conception of neutrality if necessary to play
these three roles.
As a general matter, I favor such consent-seeking. Explicit consent is,
however, unlikely in this context. Many mediators are unlikely to want to try
to draw these distinctions with parties before the parties have any experience
with mediation. Doing so would take time, effort, and patience and would
likely be frustrating for both the mediator and the parties. In addition,
explaining that "I'll be neutral, but it's complicated," is a rather unappealing
opening to a mediation. Mediators are likely to resist any requirement of
explicit consent.
A second option, therefore, is to rely upon constructive consent by the
parties to the mediator performing these core mediation functions. The
standard, again, should be whether either party could reasonably reject the
mediator's proposed intervention if that party had full information about the
mediator's proposed actions and intentions. If a mediator is satisfied that her
actions could not reasonably be rejected by either party were the parties fully
informed, the mediator should feel comfortable going through with those
actions even if the parties are not so informed. She has a check on her self-
interest; her commitments to information exchange, optimizing, and reaching
a settlement are tempered by the understanding that neither party could
reasonably reject the actions she undertakes to enact those commitments.
Neutrality as impartiality is thus preserved, even as a strict conception of
neutrality as self-disinterest is abandoned.
B. Not All CFM Leads to Biasing Interests
With this framework in place, the remaining question is whether CFM
necessarily undermines neutrality. From this functional perspective on
neutrality, one must determine which contingent fee structures create biasing
interests and which merely affirm permissible mediator beliefs and
commitments.
Self-interest may not always create partiality or a biasing interest. One
must draw distinctions regarding towards what, exactly, a contingent fee
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makes the mediator partial. 177  Consider the hypothetical posed in the
Introduction-the divorcing couple that proposes a success fee to the
mediator if their case settles. This sort of success fee removes any claim to
strict self-disinterest. The mediator has what I call a "settlement bias"
because she is no longer neutral vis-d-vis whether or not the dispute settles.
1 78
Per the critique of CFM, she may thus have a "process bias"; she may favor
those mediation processes or techniques that are most likely to encourage
settlement and disfavor aspects of mediation that are unlikely to lead to a
firm resolution. For example, she might become more focused on the dollars
and cents of the parties' dispute and less focused on transforming their rela-
tionship (assuming she did not see such transformation as necessary to
settlement).179 But the success fee will not inherently create what I will call
an "outcome bias." The mediator is not necessarily biased towards a given
outcome within the set of possible settlements; she is merely biased towards
settlement.
Will this settlement bias and process bias undermine impartiality,
thereby making it impossible for the mediator to fulfill her core functions? I
think not. These parties are attempting to align the mediator's self-interest
with their own desire to settle. Although the success fee creates a settlement
bias, it does not necessarily make the mediator partial to one side or the
other. Instead, it makes the mediator partial towards settlement-something
that the parties have explicitly stated is in their joint interest.
Moreover, this settlement bias does not undermine the mediator's three
core functions. First, because the parties have no less incentive to share such
information with the mediator, the mediator continues to be able to compare
private information to discover whether their settlement is feasible. Indeed,
this fee encourages the mediator to fulfill this function. Second, the mediator
continues to be able to optimize settlement by comparing information and
looking for trades. Often, finding creative options or trades opens up the
possibility of settlements that the parties had previously overlooked. In this
scenario, the mediator is likely to have to search for optimizing trades to
make settlement possible. Again, the success fee bolsters, rather than
undermines, this core mediative function. Finally, the success fee does not
177. For a brief discussion that makes some similar distinctions, see Silbey, supra note 124, at
351 (noting that a mediator may or may not be disinterested vis-A-vis the parties, their claims, the
importance of resolving their dispute, or the process).
178. Research has called into question whether individuals can ever remain neutral in this way.
Bazerman and others have shown what they call an "agreement-is-good" bias: People tend to see
agreement as good regardless of whether there is in fact the possibility of a mutually-beneficial
settlement. See Max Bazerman et al., When and Why Do Negotiators Outperform Game Theory?,
in THE ROLE OF NONRATIONALITY IN ORGANIZATION DECISION MAKING: CURRENT RESEARCH
INTO THE NATURE AND PROCESSES OF THE INFORMAL ORGANIZATION (Stem & Halpem, eds.,
1993).
179. The transformational mediation literature has elevated this aspect of mediation to primary
importance. See BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 162, at 81-84.
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inhibit the mediator's ability to resolve psychological or emotional issues in
the mediation. Both parties will know the mediator wants settlement, but
they will also know she is impartial as between the parties. The parties are as
likely to seek help with biases and emotions under this success fee arrange-
ment as they would be under a traditional hourly or daily rate.
This analysis does not mean that all success fees are per se acceptable.
Instead, it highlights the importance of high-quality consent to such a fee. A
success fee inherently creates a process bias; the mediator will do those
things most likely to produce settlement. If the mediator believes that
economics drive settlement decisions, she may focus on the dollars and cents
of the parties' dispute. If she believes that relational issues are key to
settlement, she may focus her energies there. Regardless, the success fee will
exacerbate the mediator's natural tendencies and style. This bias makes
informed consent by the parties critical. Only if we trust that the parties
understand the tradeoffs they are making in using the success fee should we
be comfortable with the settlement and process biases it creates. (As we will
see in Part IV, a tailored default rule can and should provide safeguards to
require such strong consent.)
Contrast this divorcing couple's success fee with the success fee
described in subpart I(B).'8° In that example, a mediator worked for a large
dispute resolution service provider. The service provider was under contract
with a corporation to handle the corporation's employment-related disputes.
Per the ADR firm's contract, the mediator would be paid only for those cases
that settled.
This service provider's success fee differs in several respects from the
divorcing couple's success fee. First, a long-term relationship exists with
one party-the corporate employer. Second, the employer is paying the full
amount of the fee, assuming some fee is paid.18' Third, a settlement bias in
this instance inherently accrues to the benefit of the employer. The employer
has sought the help of the ADR service provider because it wants to keep its
employment disputes out of court. It apparently has a vested interest in high
180. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
181. 1 do not believe that such one-side-pays arrangements are inherently biasing. In some
cases, mediators report allowing one party to pay the mediator's entire fee if the other party refuses
to contribute. Professor Stephen Goldberg, for example, has mediated in this fashion. According to
him, at least, he suffered no damage to his ability to remain neutral:
In neither of the cases in which the mediator's fees were paid by one party was I aware
of any lack of trust in the mediator on the part of the nonpaying party. The nonpaying
party participated in the selection of the mediator to the same extent as had the paying
party, and appeared unconcerned by the possibility of mediator bias in favor of the
paying party. Trust then, rather than payment, would appear to be the critical issue.
Stephen B. Goldberg, Meditations of a Mediator, 2 NEGOT. J. 345, 346 (1986). But see Kimberlee
K. Kovach, Costs of Mediation: Whose Responsibility?, 15 MEDIATION Q. 13, 19 (1997) (noting
that "[a]lthough this [practice] should not have any effect on neutrality, the practice itself may give
rise to the nonpaying party's concerns"). I do worry about the potential for partiality when such
fees are paid under institutional arrangements for long-term provision of ADR services.
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settlement rates-perhaps to avoid damage to its reputation, litigation
expenses, or the weakened employee morale that might result from the
disclosures that sometimes accompany employment litigation. Thus, in this
instance, the settlement bias created by the success fee primarily accrues-or
appears to accrue-to the benefit of one party: the employer.
This example highlights the need for a tailored approach to CFM. A
mediator should consider whether a CFM arrangement creates a biasing
interest that might undermine the mediator's three core functions. If there is
such an interest-or the appearance of such an interest-the mediator should
avoid the contingent fee. As indicated above, this clearly rules out
percentage-of-settlement fees. 182 It does leave some room for success fees.
It also leaves some room for fees that are contingent on either a percentage of
transaction cost savings or the amount of value created.
Percentage-of-cost-savings fees create similar biases to success fees.
Such a fee creates a settlement bias because the mediator can only be said to
have saved costs if the parties actually settle their dispute rather than
litigate. 183 Such a fee also creates a process bias because the mediator will
have an obvious incentive to reach resolution quickly. A percentage-of-cost-
savings fee does not, however, create an outcome bias. The mediator
remains indifferent as between the possible agreements. 
184
A percentage-of-cost-savings fee, like a success fee, will not necessarily
undermine the mediator's role. Even as she strives to work quickly, a
mediator will still have reason to try to facilitate settlement, optimize
settlement, and deal with barriers to settlement. Of these three functions, it is
the second, optimization, that is most at risk under a percentage-of-cost-
savings fee for the simple reason that a mediator may be less concerned with
optimizing the parties' agreement if such optimization takes time (and
therefore might decrease her percentage-of-cost-savings fee). Lack of
optimization will not necessarily be the case because the mediator may need
to optimize to be able to get the parties to reach agreement. But it could be
the case because the percentage-of-cost-savings fee creates a process bias.
This risk is one that reasonable parties might wish to bear. Some
contexts do not afford great value-creating opportunities.185 Personal injury
182. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
183. One could theoretically save costs as compared to unassisted negotiation. The mediator
could argue that the parties would have bargained for longer and still failed to reach agreement had
they not used a mediator. Most likely, however, such fees would only be earned when the
mediation had, in fact, produced agreement.
184. If one could show that certain agreements were strongly linked to cost savings-in other
words, that certain agreements could be arrived at quickly, whereas others would take more time-
then one might say that a mediator using such a fee had an indirect outcome bias. She would be
partial to those agreements that could be reached quickly.
185. See, e.g., MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING, supra note 143, at 42-43 (discussing a
spectrum of negotiation contexts, some with value-creating opportunities, some without).
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litigation, for example, presents a largely distributive bargaining problem;
there are few ways to create value in such a single-issue, one-shot
negotiation. Mediating parties in this context might be more concerned
about saving costs than about finding a Pareto-efficient agreement. On the
other hand, the class action example raised in subpart I(A) may afford
opportunities for value-creating trades. In that context, there is greater risk
that a percentage-of-cost-savings fee could so bias the mediation process that
the parties would rush to a given settlement without sufficient consideration
of its merits. In addition, the quality of client consent to settlement, or fee,
terms in the class action context is notoriously questionable. One might fear
collusion between the mediator and class counsel. Class counsel could offer
the mediator a percentage-of-cost-savings fee in return for a quick,
unquestioned, but ill-considered settlement of the class litigation.
The point, again, is that CFM arrangements must be considered on a
case-by-case basis. Although the class action example from subpart I(A)
might seem inappropriate on its face, not all percentage-of-cost-savings fees
will be suspect. In some settings, informed parties could quite reasonably
decide that such a fee was in their joint interest. Particularly if structured as
a voluntary post-mediation bonus, as in the example in subpart I(A),
informed parties could see such a fee as an antidote to delay. The divorcing
couple discussed above, for example, might be willing to make the
mediator's fee contingent on the savings they expect by forgoing litigation-
savings quite easy to quantify. They might realize that a mediator could help
them overcome personality or emotional issues that stand in the way of
settlement and might be willing to give a portion of their saved transaction
costs to a third party to help them in this way.'
86
Finally, consider a fee based on the percentage of value created by a
mediator. Once again, such a fee does not inherently create a biasing
interest. There is no reason why one party or another would be
disproportionately benefited by a more Pareto-efficient resolution of the
dispute. Instead, both parties should benefit if they can arrive at a more
optimal settlement.' 87 It is true that a given solution might be more benefi-
186. The economics of bargaining suggests that litigating parties should almost always settle
because, by doing so, they can capture-and split-for themselves the transaction costs they would
otherwise spend on going to court. See, e.g., Bruce L. Hay, Effort, Information, Settlement, Trial,
24 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1995) (noting that, since settling saves litigation costs, parties can divide and
keep the surplus created by not litigating); Steven Shavell, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An
Economic Analysis, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 11 (1995) (arguing that, unless the difference between the
plaintiff's and defendant's expected judgments exceeds the sum of their trial costs, the parties will
settle to save such costs). If one accepts that bargaining failures will sometimes occur because of
information asymmetries, psychological biases, or emotional or relationship barriers, then one can
imagine that parties could rationally hire a mediator to help them settle under an arrangement
whereby the mediator captured a portion of the transaction cost surplus and the parties retained the
rest.
187. This is necessarily true if a mediator helps the parties reach a strongly efficient solution-
better for both than some baseline outcome. It is also true, however, even if the mediator only helps
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cial to one party, but this imbalance is both unknowable in advance and of no
consequence-the same could be said of any negotiated outcome, regardless
of whether it is Pareto-efficient.
Given that such a fee should have no impact on impartiality, it should
not undermine the mediator's three core functions. Indeed, as with some of
these other fees" structures, a percentage-of-value-created fee underscores an
aspect of the mediator's role-finding value-creating settlements-and
encourages the mediator to play that role fully.
Even if unobjectionable, it is worth noting that such percentage-of-
value-created fees may be difficult to implement. It may be hard to deter-
mine how much value the mediation created because there may be no clear
baseline against which to compare. In the scenario discussed in subpart I(A),
for example, two corporate parties ultimately agreed to undertake a joint
venture together that they had not previously contemplated. This aspect of
their negotiated agreement clearly differs from what they would have
received from the litigation process, and, in that sense, the parties did better
than they could have otherwise. But the parties might have been able to find
this joint venture without the assistance of a mediator. They might have
simply settled their underlying contract litigation and then, months or years
later, have discovered the joint venture possibility. Can one thus attribute the
earnings from that joint venture to the mediator's efforts? How should the
parties distinguish the mediator's contribution from the work of the
management consultants, investment bankers, and lawyers that inevitably
would be involved? To make a percentage-of-value-created fee work, the
parties and the mediator would either have to establish ex ante what
comparisons would be used ex post to determine value creation, or they
would have to make the fee a voluntary bonus.
The point is, however, simple. CFM does not inherently create a
biasing interest on the mediator's part. Instead, it can be used to align the
mediator's interests with those of the parties. Contingent fees can support,
rather than undermine, the mediator's core functions.
C. CFM Promotes Party Autonomy
As illustrated above, the classical conception of neutrality was closely
tied to respect for party autonomy. 88 The classical conception assumed that
respect for party autonomy required strict neutrality, defined as both imparti-
ality and self-disinterest. I think this assumption has it backwards. Respect
for party autonomy requires allowing parties to have a say in what sort of
the parties reach a weakly efficient solution-better for one than the baseline, but only as good as
the baseline for the other. Assuming the possibility of side payments, both parties should prefer a
more efficient solution to a baseline-dominated solution.
188. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
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neutrality they want. A contractarian approach recognizes that parties may
wish to shape neutrality to their own needs. Thus, although it is important
for mediators to maintain sufficient impartiality to be able to fulfill their
basic functions as mediators, certain aspects of neutrality can be varied to
meet the parties' interests in the dispute resolution process.
If parties are focused on reaching settlement, they may want a mediator
with incentives to settle. A success fee may be appropriate in such
circumstances. Similarly, if parties prioritize optimizing their settlement-
finding available value-creating trades-they may want to tie the mediator's
compensation to a percentage of value created.
It is important to note that this approach does not presuppose what
mediation style or approach the mediator will take. Some have argued, for
example, for a transformative approach to mediation in which the mediator
attempts to help the parties transform their relationship through personal
empowerment and recognition.189 This vision of mediation is consistent with
my own. I argue simply that a mediator should be accountable for doing
what she is hired to do. Thus, if two parties wanted to make the mediator's
fee contingent on successfully transforming the relationship, so be it. So
long as, per subpart III(A) above, a mediator's core functions are not
sacrificed, the parties should be able to tie their mediator's compensation to
whatever variable they choose.
V. Contractarian Economics and the Regulation Of Mediation
We have now come to the final stage of my argument. Currently the
mediation profession regulates CFM using an immutable, untailored rule:
when regulated, CFM is prohibited. 90  Good reasons exist for CFM,
however, in some circumstances. In particular, allowing parties to use
CFM-and to tailor the sort of neutrality they desire from their mediator-
gives parties more control over the mediation process and its outcomes. The
remaining question, therefore, is how best to regulate CFM. Assuming CFM
should be permitted in some circumstances, what sort of rule structure makes
most sense?
A. A Tailored CFMDefault Rule
In the lawyer-client context, immutable rules about contingency fees
have given way to default rules over time. Whereas the common law
traditionally prohibited contingency fees entirely, 19' the Model Rules of
189. See BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 162, at 84-85.
190. See supra Part 11.
191. Richard W. Painter, Litigating on a Contingency: A Monopoly of Champions or a Market
for Champerty?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 625, 639-40 (1995) (discussing how the common law
prohibition on contingency fees came from the doctrine of champerty).
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Professional Conduct permit contingency fees so long as the attorney-client
contract is in writing and clearly states how the fee will be determined.'
92
Although attorneys are still subject to an immutable requirement that such
fees be reasonable,193 the Model Rules allow attorneys and clients to opt-in to
a contingency arrangement provided they meet certain requirements.1
94
Part III suggests that a similar evolution should occur in mediation
ethics regarding CFM. I propose the following rule as a guide for future
mediation ethics codes:
A mediator shall not take a fee contingent on any aspect of a
mediation unless
(a) the mediator discloses, in writing, the fee arrangement and its
potential consequences, the mediator recommends that the
parties consult with counsel about the fee arrangement, and,
prior to the mediation, all parties provide informed consent in
writing and after an opportunity to consult with counsel;
(b) in court-ordered mediation, the fee arrangement is disclosed
to and approved by the court prior to the mediation; and
(c) the fee arrangement does not create an appearance or
actuality ofpartiality toward one party.
This is a tailored default rule-sections (a) and (b)-coupled with an
immutable standard-section (c). It assumes that CFM is prohibited but
allows for parties to contract around that prohibition in certain circumstances.
First, the contingent fee must not create partiality towards one party. This
immutable requirement is set in section (c) by a general standard. This stan-
dard is similar to the current neutrality requirements in the Model Standards
and in the Georgetown-CPR proposal.195 Second, the mediator must disclose
the fee to the parties in writing and provide the parties with sufficient infor-
mation to be able to give informed consent to the fee. Parties must provide
their consent in writing and after an opportunity to consult with counsel.
These formal requirements serve to establish a record of the disclosures
made, to channel the behavior of mediators and parties, and to signal the
importance of the CFM issue. 196 Finally, in court-connected mediation, a
mediator must have the fee arrangement approved by the presiding judge
prior to beginning the mediation.'
97
192. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(c); see also Painter, Rules Lawyers Play By,
supra note 14, at 694 n. 157 (discussing the repeal of the prohibition on contingency fees).
193. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(c) (2002).
194. Id.
195. See supra notes 65-69, 87 and accompanying text.
196. See Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 800-01 (1941)
(discussing the functions of formality).
197. Such approval seems important to alleviate concerns that parties using a court-appointed
mediator, who could be considered a state actor, might require greater protections against abuse
before making use of CFM. See Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation:
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Is this rule better than the status quo immutable prohibition on CFM?
As noted, an immutable ban on CFM would be justified if it were necessary
either to protect some valuable social interest or to protect vulnerable parties
from abuse at the hands of mediators. 198 Neither concern seems to justify the
existing prohibition on CFM. First, the dominant social interest in question
is our desire to protect the mediation process from distortion and keep
mediation as a viable and fair alternative to adjudication. If CFM inevitably
undermines the mediation process, an immutable rule makes sense. As
already illustrated, however, CFM does not necessarily subvert the
mediator's ability to assist parties in resolving their disputes. Only certain
types of CFM-in particular, percentage-of-settlement fees-necessarily
create biasing interests that may make a mediator ineffective. Thus, a broad
immutable ban on CFM seems overinclusive.
What about the need to protect parties from unscrupulous mediators?
This concern is certainly valid. As noted above, institutional oversight of
mediation is limited, and mediators are rarely disciplined or held accountable
through malpractice actions. 199 An immutable ban on CFM might thus be
called for if we expected that mediators would have the upper hand in nego-
tiations with parties concerning the decision to use CFM. Is this likely?
This is an empirical question, and one that I cannot answer definitively.
But I think it is rather unlikely for several reasons. First, private mediation is
a referral-driven business. A mediator depends on referrals to find future
work. Reputational markets thus put some constraints on mediator behavior.
Furthermore, CFM is inherently sensitive; a mediator considering its use will
know that her actions will be scrutinized by colleagues, judges, and clients
that might refer her future work. Assuming that a mediator cares about such
referrals, she is unlikely to construct skewed fee arrangements that could be
called into question.
Second, attorneys are involved in many private mediations. Divorcing
parties and civil litigants generally have lawyers as well as mediators.
2 00
What's Justice Got to Do With It?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787, 833 (2001) ("Particularly in court-
connected mediation, this third party is likely to be perceived as a representative of the courts and as
an authority figure."). In depth discussion of this potential problem is beyond the scope of this
Article. For a discussion of the state actor problem, see generally Richard C. Reuben,
Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution and Public Civil
Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949 (2000) and Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice: Toward a State
Action Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 85 CAL. L. REV. 577 (1997). But see Nancy A.
Welsh, Disputants' Decision Control in Court-Connected Mediation: A Hollow Promise Without
Procedural Justice, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 179, 188 (2002) (arguing that consensual mediation is not
state action).
198. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
200. Diane Fomari, Expanding Horizons for Domestic Litigation in West Virginia - Divorce
Mediation, 10 W. VA. LAWYER, Mar. 1997, at 12, 12.
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Only in low-stakes litigation are attorneys regularly not involved. 20 1 But in
such low-stakes cases, a mediator is unlikely to want a contingent fee or to
spend the time to explain contingent fees and contract around the default
rule. In higher stakes disputes, the likely presence of counsel will make it
unlikely that a mediator will be able to propose or enforce a manipulative or
one-sided fee arrangement. Again, parties are likely to be inherently wary of
CFM and their attorneys even more so. For a mediator to persuade parties to
contract around my proposed default rule will require that the mediator dis-
close her understanding of her fee arrangement, its consequences, and its
likely benefits. Assuming the assistance of counsel, I doubt that parties will
unwittingly enter into one-sided CFM arrangements.
Third, my proposed rule contains a tailored provision related to court-
connected mediation. I require that parties inform the presiding judge of
their decision to use CFM. This requirement will serve several purposes.
First, a judge could obviously intervene in the mediation process if the judge
is concerned about the improper use of CFM. Second, and more importantly,
this requirement will likely deter mediators from overreaching contingent-fee
arrangements.
In general, my proposed default rule on CFM will promote efficiency by
allowing parties to tailor a mediator's incentive structure to best align with
their joint interests. This tailored arrangement should reduce agency costs
and allow parties to obtain more value out of their mediator. In addition, it
should promote differentiation within the market for mediators. It will allow
mediators to signal their approach to mediation by using certain types of
contingent fees. It will also allow parties to hold mediators somewhat
accountable for their actions and help potential parties to distinguish
confident (and high quality) mediators from those less interested in
accountability.
20 2
My proposed rule has obvious information-forcing or penalty qualities.
It requires negotiation between parties and their potential mediator prior to
the mediation, and it requires that mediators disclose sufficient information
to parties to allow them to make an informed choice about the use of CFM.
This disclosure not only serves to ensure that CFM is used wisely but should
also assist parties as they attempt to distinguish mediators in the marketplace.
In particular, it may provide a vehicle for conversations about a given
mediator's style and approach--conversations that I believe should be much
more common.
201. See, e.g., John P. McCrory, Mandated Mediation of Civil Cases in State Courts: A
Litigant's Perspective on Program Model Choices, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 813, 816 n.14
(1999) (stating that parties to small claims are not often represented by lawyers).
202. See Maute, Public Values and Private Justice, supra note 124, at 521-35 (discussing
mediator accountability).
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My proposed rule would have various implications for current
mediation practice. If we return to the four examples with which we
began-all of which were barred by current prohibitions on CFM-we can
see that this tailored rule would permit contingent fee mediation in some, but
not all, conceivable mediation situations.
For example, my rule would categorically deny the possibility of
percentage-of-settlement fees. As discussed above, such fees violate the
rule's requirement that no fee arrangement shall create an appearance or
actuality of partiality toward one party.20 3 But the rule would permit some
success fees contingent on the occurrence of settlement, as well as fees based
on cost savings or value created. As indicated in Part III, although such fees
may eliminate a mediator's claim to absolute self-disinterest, they do not
necessarily bias the mediator towards one party (and would therefore not run
afoul of the rule's section (c)). Subject to its various constraints, the rule
would also permit voluntary bonuses given after a mediation's conclusion.
Would the adoption of this rule change the incidence of CFM and make
contingent fees commonplace in mediation? Again, this is an empirical
question that I cannot answer. My suspicion is that such a rule would have
some impact on the incidence of CFM. In particular, I think it likely that
some demand exists among disputants for mediation based on success fees.
Were a mediator to offer success-fee-based services, I expect that that
mediator would have some competitive advantage in the market for
mediation. Although many parties would undoubtedly shy away from
success fees because of their potential effect on a mediator's behavior, others
would welcome the increased accountability that such fees would bring.
Other types of contingent fees, particularly percentage-of-cost-savings
and percentage-of-value-created fees, are less likely to become wildly
popular. I expect, however, that there is some mediator demand for such
fees. Particularly in large, complex disputes with high stakes, it would be
reasonable for a mediator to feel undercompensated currently, even when
charging a high daily or hourly rate. In the "percentage-of-value-created"
scenario described in Part 1,204 for example, the parties realized approxi-
mately $500 million in additional gains as a result of the mediator's efforts.
Although this may be rare, it is possible. A savvy mediator can help parties
turn a dispute into a business opportunity. Such a mediator may serve as a
dispute resolver, deal broker, and management consultant. If the mediator
can help the parties find value and can reach satisfactory agreement with
those parties about how that value should be measured, it is not unreasonable
for the mediator to seek a percentage of the value created.
A final and slightly difficult question is raised: are mediators likely to
want to use CFM? The advantages are clear. In some cases, a mediator
203. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
204. See supra section II(B)(4).
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might be compensated more fairly under a CFM arrangement than under an
hourly or daily fee agreement. In addition, a mediator might value the
increased accountability that accompanies CFM. She might be willing, even
eager, to absorb the risk of a success fee, for example, in return for the right
to increased compensation if her skills led to a successful resolution of the
parties' dispute.
But mediators face a particular disadvantage that I have not yet
mentioned. That is the risk of exploitation by parties who try to use CFM to
avoid compensating a mediator entirely. The danger is obvious. If a
mediator is to be compensated only if the case settles, the parties could use
the mediator's services and then stop short of settling. They might then
continue to negotiate after the mediation ends, settle on their own without the
mediator, and reap the benefit of the mediation without incurring its cost.
2 °5
Does this pragmatic problem completely spoil CFM for mediators? I do
not think it does. Mediators might combat exploitation in several ways.
First, a CFM fee agreement will undoubtedly need to include a good faith
provision binding parties not to engage in this sort of behavior. Such a
provision would be somewhat similar to a clause in a real estate agency
contract that obligates a seller to pay their agent rather than sell their home
independently. But it may not be quite as easy to enforce as such a real
estate clause. In real estate, agents can monitor the sale of a home. If a
homeowner tries to shirk her contractual obligations, the real estate agent is
likely to discover that behavior. It may be more difficult-although not
impossible-for a mediator to track the eventual disposition of disputes that
fail to settle during mediation. Nevertheless, such clauses would
undoubtedly have some impact on party behavior.
Second, this fear of exploitation may make mediators think twice about
using CFM with unknown parties. Instead, a mediator may employ CFM
only when reputational information suffices to reassure the mediator that
exploitation is unlikely. If the mediator knows one or both parties or has
worked with their attorneys before, the mediator may feel comfortable with
CFM.
Finally, mediators may be more likely to try CFM in mediations that
occur "on the eve of trial" when there may be little chance left for post-
mediation bargaining. In such instances, the exploitation risk may be fairly
low.
In all events, these possible problems should not prohibit mediators and
parties from trying CFM in some instances. Mediators are well-positioned to
assess the risks of such fee structures. With a well-tailored default rule, they
205. I thank Michael Moffitt and Kimberly Kovach for highlighting the need to discuss this
problem.
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will explore alternative fee structures to the extent that the benefits outweigh
those risks.
B. Broader Implications of a Contractarian Approach to Mediation Ethics
Although I have focused throughout this Article on neutrality and
contingent fee mediation, my approach to these issues has broader
implications for the field of mediation ethics. As it has in the world of legal
ethics, contractarian thinking could greatly influence the regulation of
mediation. Here I explore two potential influences.
1. Other Rules Ripe for Revision.-Even if one is not interested in the
CFM debate, the discussion to this point has shown the potential power of a
contractarian approach to mediation ethics. The contractarian taxonomy of
rule types opens up a range of regulatory choices that are often overlooked in
current ethics codes. In addition to the prohibition on CFM, other mediation
ethics rules are ripe for revision or re-analysis in light of this contractarian
approach. Here I consider just two.
206
a. Control Over Terminating (or Not Terminating) a Mediation.-
Consider, for example, the immutable rule in the Model Standards stating
that "[t]he parties decide when and under what conditions they will reach an
agreement or terminate a mediation. 2 °7 The mediation community has long
assumed that parties must be free to walk away from a mediation and that
this freedom is a fundamental part of the self-determination that mediation
offers.20 8 But is an immutable rule justified in this instance? I think this is
open to question for at least two reasons.
First, one can imagine various scenarios in which, like Ulysses tying
himself to the mast to avoid the sirens' song, parties might want to cede
control over the termination of their mediation to their mediator. This
presents a classic precommitment problem. At the start of a mediation-
Time 0-the parties might know that later they could be subject to needs and
interests that at Time 0 they found unsavory. They might fear that public
opinion or the pull of constituents would overwhelm their better judgment
and force them to terminate the mediation unwisely. At Time 0, they might
therefore wish to cede that control to the mediator to keep their future selves
from making a choice that their present selves disfavored. This situation is
akin to a smoker's decision to destroy her cigarettes so as not to give in to a
206. Others include the following: the conflict of interest rules for mediators, which perhaps
should vary by context; various rules that could be tailored to address mediation by large,
institutional ADR service providers; and mediator accountability rules that could be revised to allow
parties and mediators to opt-in to more stringent accountability for the mediator.
207. MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS, supra note 5, § VI.
208. See, e.g., KOROBKtN, supra note 153, at 344.
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future impulse or to the choice to place one's alarm clock far from one's bed
so as to precommit oneself to get up at a certain time, knowing one's propen-
sity to hit the snooze button.2 °9 Instead of an immutable requirement that
parties have control over the termination decision, one might imagine a
default rule vesting such power in parties but allowing them to contract with
a mediator for penalties (payable to the other party) in the event of
termination before an agreed-upon time.
Parties might have a second-and in some ways opposite-reason for
desiring a default rule regarding termination. Jennifer Brown and Ian Ayres
have shown that, in some circumstances, a mediator's ability to help parties
is undermined by the ability of the parties to continue to bargain even if they
walk away from the mediation.21 Consider a simple mediation in which the
mediator privately solicits an offer from the defendant and a demand from
the plaintiff. If the defendant offers more than the plaintiff demands, the case
is settled. If not, the mediation is over, and the parties must go to court.
In this mediation, the parties have an incentive to be reasonable. If they
state their offers and demands accurately, without inflating them to try to
"get a better deal," they have a greater chance of settling the case and saving
the transaction costs of litigating.211 And, if the mediator can actually bind
them to a promise not to keep bargaining after the mediation, then this
chance is thejr last one at settlement. If, on the other hand, the parties can
continue to negotiate even after a failed mediation, the situation changes.
The game theoretic problem is simple: if the parties are free to continue
bargaining after the "mediation game" is over, the parties have less incentive
to dampen strategic posturing during the mediation game.212 Instead, they
can engage in brinkmanship, hope to get an advantageous deal, and continue
bargaining if no deal emerges.
Brown and Ayres argue that "[t]he mediator's ability to prohibit further
negotiation... plays a crucial role" in dampening strategic behavior during
mediation.213 They demonstrate that "[t]he expected gains from trade can at
times be increased ... if the parties commit not to trade when their private
reports of value to the mediator are not overlapping. 2t 4
209. For an introduction to precommitment problems generally, see JON ELSTER, ULYSSES
UNBOUND (2000) and JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND
IRRATIONALITY (1979).
210. Brown & Ayres, Economic Rationales, supra note 154, at 354.
211. See generally MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING, supra note 143, at 101-07.
212. Brown & Ayres, Economic Rationales, supra note 154, at 342.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 335. I am assuming this assertion to be true without going into the economic
analysis that underlies it. (I heartily recommend the Brown & Ayres essay.)
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This point suggests that, in some instances, a mediator needs both the
power to terminate the mediation and the power to prevent the parties from
negotiating further after a mediation ends. This is completely at odds,
however, with the immutable rule on termination in the Model Standards.
This variance suggests that, in some instances, disputing parties might want
to be able to contract with their mediator for a quite different regime on the
termination of their mediation session.
b. The Facilitative or Evaluative Debate.-Another debate in the
mediation ethics community would benefit from contractarian analysis. That
is the dispute over whether mediators should be permitted to engage in
"evaluation" of a dispute. Typically, mediators are barred from giving
parties an estimate of the settlement value of their litigation if the litigation
were to go to court.
2 15
This debate has raged long and hard, and I see no reason to rehash it
here. I will instead make only one tentative suggestion. Perhaps the debate
could be put to rest by altering the assumption that mediation should or
should not be evaluative or that parties do or do not want facilitation or
evaluation. Instead, a contractarian approach to mediation ethics would
suggest that mediation ethics codes should provide a menu of options for
mediators and parties. One might, for example, have a penalty default rule
that provided that mediators should not provide evaluation absent written and
informed consent by both parties. Such a rule would require that a mediator
disclose information to the parties about the costs and benefits of evaluation,
which might appease some critics of evaluation who worry that it is foisted
upon unsuspecting parties. But a default rule would also allow parties to
choose the type of mediation style they preferred, rather than imposing a
uniform style on all mediations. (One could also tailor such a rule. Perhaps
some contexts are more appropriate for evaluation, and thus mediation ethics
codes could specify different constraints on evaluation in those contexts.)
2. The Evolution of Mediation Ethics.-As a more general matter, I
believe that a contractarian approach to mediation ethics could greatly assist
in the ongoing evolution of the regulation of alternative dispute resolution.
Part I illustrated that mediation ethics codes and regulations are in some
ways confused and disparate. A given mediator or mediation is often subject
to many overlapping codes and obligations. Little or no systematic enforce-
ment of these codes exists. In short, the mediation profession has failed to
develop self-regulatory mechanisms on par with those of other professions.
215. Cf Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations, supra note 142, at 44 (discussing the
benefits and detriments of having a mediator evaluate the value of a case should it go to court).
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Moving beyond the status quo in mediation ethics will not be easy
because of the dilemma identified in the Introduction. On the one hand,
mediators need clear ethical rules to guide their behavior. On the other hand,
the mediation profession is radically heterogeneous. The types of
mediations, dispute contexts in which mediation is used, and styles of
mediation are many. Simple ethical rules will often not apply comfortably
across such contexts. If the rules are strict enough to enforce, they will be
too strict to work.
This dilemma has bogged down the evolution of mediation ethics. I
believe, however, that a contractarian approach offers a way out. The key is
to change a critical assumption that has guided the promulgation of media-
tion ethics codes to date: that ethical duties should be cast as categorical
immutable duties designed to apply to all mediations regardless of context.
Mediation codes have succumbed to this tendency to their detriment.
16
The assumption that ethical obligations must be immutable has led to a
predictable end of unhelpful, fuzzy standards. As Richard Painter has
explained in the context of legal ethics rules, rulemaking bodies often turn to
standards instead of rules when they agree upon a given principle or social
interest but disagree on the specifics of how best to protect it.2 17 In the face
of such disagreement, an immutable rule seems too harsh. Such bodies
therefore may turn to immutable standards as a sort of compromise. The
choice of a standard over a rule softens the impact of their decisionmaking
without taking the teeth out of their ethical guidelines.
A contractarian approach to mediation ethics advocates for a different
resolution to this dilemma. It accommodates heterogeneity in the mediation
field by permitting parties and mediators to opt-in to certain obligations and
opt-out of others, depending on the parties' needs. This choice advocates the
use of default rules rather than immutable rules. At the same time, it
accommodates the need to provide guidance to the mediation profession by
setting clear and tailored rules instead of fuzzy, untailored standards. Such
tailored rules should be palatable to rulemakers because they are merely
defaults. Parties can shape them to suit their needs.
In some ways, this is the approach taken by Hawaii in its recent revision
to its CFM rules. As discussed above, the Hawaii judiciary has promulgated
three inconsistent possibilities with regard to CFM and permits parties to
choose between them. 218 The Hawaii approach, however, seems too lax.
216. See Jamie Henikoff & Michael Moffit, Remodeling the Model Standards of Conduct for
Mediators, 2 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 87, 95-96 (1997) (criticizing the existing mediation standards
for setting out "inflexible rules that all attorneys 'shall' or 'must' observe, regardless of
circumstance").
217. See Painter, Rules Lawyers Play By, supra note 14, at 688-90 (discussing how, in the
context of lawyer's fees and sexual relations between a lawyer and client, states have preferred
standards to rules).
218. See supra notes 96-104 and accompanying text.
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The rules have little detail, and they ultimately provide little real guidance.
But they do suggest the right direction for mediation ethics generally. If we
wish to accommodate the diverse needs of the mediation profession, we must
revise our assumptions about how best to formulate the profession's ethical
codes. Contractarian analysis offers much insight into that task.
VI. Conclusion
This Article has argued for three interrelated points. First, contingent
fee mediation may be appropriate in some circumstances. Second, although
the use of CFM has implications for our traditional understanding of
mediator neutrality, that understanding is ripe for revision. Not only is the
classical conception of mediator neutrality flawed, but the critique of it has
been misguided as well. Finally, both of these issues--CFM and what
neutrality requires-can benefit from returning to the notion of mediation as
a creature of contract. A contractarian approach to mediation ethics would
guide parties through tailored default rules that permitted parties and
mediators to shape their mediation to best meet the parties' needs. This
approach has much to offer to the regulation of mediation ethics generally.
2003]
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